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



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

THESIS

THE SOVIET NAVAL INDIAN OCEAN SQUADRON

RAISON D'ETRE: ACTION OR REACTION?

by

Allen Marvin Stout

September 1983

Thesis Advisor: M. Clough

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

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The Soviet Naval Indian Ocean Squadron Raison D'Etre: Action or Reaction?

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., University of Illinois, 1977

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ABSTRACT

The Soviet Naval Indian Ocean Squadron began its active deployments to the Indian Ocean in 1968. This led to a wide-ranging debate as to its purpose, which could be active or reactive in nature. To deal properly with the Squadron, it is important for the planner to understand the difference between the two.

This thesis examines the broad range of theorized missions for the Squadron. These Western theories are compared to determine the relative merits of each. A very select number of Soviet writers' works are examined for any correlation with the Western theories. This is set against the background of a historical survey of U.S. and Soviet naval relations in the region. The results of these comparisons lead to the conclusion that the Squadron's mission is both active and reactive, and that most of the theories have some merit.

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

Figure 0.1 MAP OF THE INDIAN OCEAN.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the Soviet Naval Indian Ocean Squadron's (SNIOS, or the Squadron) active deployments began in 1968, there has been an ongoing debate as to its purpose. This thesis will summarize the various positions in the debate, and determine whether the available evidence supports or discredits one theory or another.

There are two broad categories into which the Squadron's missions may fall: active and reactive. An active mission is one which is preplanned, in pursuit of larger and longer-range goals. An example of an active mission is the Squadron's visitation of Indian Ocean ports in pursuit of increased political influence for the Soviet Union in the third world. Conversely, a reactive mission is one which is triggered by an event or circumstance. The theory that the Squadron was formed in 1968 in reaction to the U.S. Navy's Indian Ocean presence would indicate a reactive mission.

It is recognized that naval forces inherently fulfill both active and reactive missions. This is particularly true when one realizes that one of the most important preplanned missions of a naval force is to prepare for and react to circumstances and events as necessary. The active and reactive missions can be visualized as a continuum with

an active mission at one end, and a reactive mission at the other. At any given moment, the objective of a naval force will fall somewhere on that continuum.

To the degree that the Squadron's mission is active, the planner, knowing the missions and having at his disposal some historical referents, can predict the operations of the Squadron with a reasonable degree of certainty and reliability, and can then incorporate this predictive capability into U.S. planning. To the degree that the Squadron's role is reactive, however, the planner is in a much more tenuous predictive position. It is important to first determine what the Squadron is reacting to. If it is reacting to a U.S. military presence in the region, then the planner can anticipate the reaction, and take it into account. If, however, it is reacting to an independent event in the Indian Ocean littoral, which includes a large portion of the third world, a reasonable predictive capability can only be maintained if the events themselves can be predicted, or the reaction patterns to surprises can be discerned.

In order that the U.S. naval planner can adequately account for the SNIOS then, three questions have to be answered:

1. To what degree is the Squadron's mission active, or reactive?
2. To the degree that it is active, what are its missions?

3. To the degree that it is reactive, what is it reacting to, and what patterns, if any, can be discerned?

In order to answer these questions, this thesis will take four parts. First, a historical survey will be made of the U.S. and Soviet naval relations and force levels in the Indian Ocean. Second, U.S. literature on the subject of Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean will be selectively surveyed to determine the range of active missions theorized or recognized by U.S. writers. The ideas put forward by the different authors will be situated in such a framework as to place competing arguments against each other, to see if the arguments of one may be dismissed through the logic of another. In this manner, the arguments of each author will be used as evidence to support or refute the others. Third, the U.S. literature will be surveyed to determine the range of reactive missions theorized or recognized by the U.S. writers, again using the authors as under active missions.

Fourth, a sample of Soviet writings on the Indian Ocean will be reviewed. The risk in reviewing Soviet literature is understood. It is believed, however, that if the Soviets themselves say they have a certain mission in the region, then it should be taken seriously, if not accepted verbatim. The literature is reviewed in order to grasp the essence of Soviet writings on the region, and to determine if their is

any correlation between U.S. theories on their presence in the Indian Ocean, and stated Soviet interests and objectives there.

The discovery of any correlations, or lack of thereof, will then produce a statement of determination of the general mission structure of the Squadron. The statement of general mission structure will be followed by recommendations for U.S. planners with respect to the best way to take the Squadron into account.

II. HISTORY AND FORCE LEVELS

The Soviets began their regular naval deployments in 1968. Soviet ship-days in the Indian Ocean from 1968-1974 were approximately:

1968 = 1,800

1969 = 2,800

1971 = 3,400

1972 = 8,800

1974 = 9,060

1/3 to 1/2 of these units were warships. The increase in 1972 was due to the Indo-Pakistani War and the Chittagong mine-clearing operations. [Ref. 1]. During OKEAN-75, the Soviet Arabian Sea units operated with IL-38s from Berbera, and TU-95s from central Asia. [Ref. 2].

The following is Watson's analysis of the standard Indian Ocean Squadron of 20-22 ships, from 1968-1980:

1 cruiser

2 destroyers

0-1 cruise missile submarine

1 attack submarine

2 frigates

1 minesweeper

2 amphitious ships

0-1 intelligence collector

10 auxiliary ships

1 hydrographic research ship [Ref. 3].

In ship-days, the Squadron's presence was:

1. 1968 = 1,200
2. 1974 = 10,500
3. 1975-1979 = 7,000-8,000
4. 1980 = 11,800. [1] [Ref. 4].

Other estimates of the average makeup of the Squadron appear to compare pretty closely with Watson's analysis. Nitze and Sullivan estimate the normal deployment to be 8-10 combatants and 10 replenishment and stores ships. [Ref. 5]. Stone's analysis showed the Soviets usually having 20-24 ships in the region, with 1/3 to 1/2 being combatants, including guided missile ships, ASW ships, and submarines. [Ref. 6].

The U.S. Middle East Force began its presence in 1949. The Seventh Fleet began deployents to the Indian Ocean in 1964 with the Concord CV task force. [Ref. 7]. Occasional 'excursions' into the Indian ocean were made in the early and mid-1970s by Seventh Fleet units consisting either of an aircraft carrier and escorts or several cruiser-destroyer type ships with a squadron commander embarked. These always stayed a few months and then departed. Near-continucus U.S.

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[1]The increase in 1974 was due mainly to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, as well as indicating the early buildup to the present "normal" squadron force level. The increase in 1980 was due to the Iranian crisis.

naval ship deployments to the Indian Ocean (other than the ever-present Middle East Force) began in November of 1978. A group around USS Sterett (CG-31) entered in November of that year. [Ref. 8]. Up to 27 U.S. Navy warships were on patrol and exercising in the area, under sea and air surveillance, in 1978. [Ref. 9].

Then, with the fall of the Shah of Iran in January, 1979, the naval situation in the Indian Ocean began to heat up drastically. In May 1979, the Somali port of Berbera had its first visit by a U.S. warship. Until this time, the U.S. had declined to take advantage of Somalia's offers of port access. The coincidence of this first U.S. visit, so soon after the fall of the Shah probably indicates a shift in U.S. policy, searching for a new regional strategy. The Soviet Kiev-class carrier Minsk was concurrently conducting exercises off the coast of the PDRY for the benefit of local officials. The Minsk eventually moved on to the Pacific Fleet. [Ref. 10].

During the Iranian crisis, the Soviets had more than 20 ships in the Indian Ocean, over three times the U.S. presence. [Ref. 11]. From 1970-1979, the Soviet to U.S. ship-days ratio has been 3-4:1, not including submarines. [Ref. 12]. In 1979, the option of forming a U.S. Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean was being discussed. In late February, 1979, National Security Advisor Brzezinski pushed for an increased military presence in the Indian Ocean.

Through the spring of 1979, the U.S. focused on the presence of naval forces in the Indian Ocean rather than look for possible bases ashore. The Soviet Union maintained 18-20 ships in the Indian Ocean in addition to the ships it sent to the South China Sea as a show of support for Vietnam in its border war with the PRC in 1979. [Ref. 13]. What became known as the Carter Doctrine was announced in the State of the Union message to the Congress on 23 January, 1980, about one month after Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. This speech stated that the U.S. considered the Persian Gulf region as an area of vital interest, and that it would defend it with whatever means necessary, including military force.

On 8 March 1979, USS Constellation (CV-64) was ordered to the Indian Ocean. By 6 April, the combined Indian Ocean-Middle East Force strength amounted to 15 ships. Some were intended to show support for North Yemen in their war against the PDRY. In October 1979, the U.S. Middle East Force was expanded by two destroyers, and the number of annual task force deployments was increased from three to four. In December 1979, there were 19 U.S. warships in the Arabian Sea, including two CVs. [Ref. 14]. The embassy in Iran was seized on 4 November 1979. By the end of the month, the total U.S.N. ship strength in the region had grown to 21. At least two carrier battle groups would be maintained in the Indian Ocean for the two years subsequent

to the seizure of the embassy. The total U.S.N. ship count reached 31 on 16 March 1980 with the arrival of a Seventh Fleet MAU. This was the first of four such task groups to deploy to the Indian Ocean, resulting in a Navy-Marine amphibious team on station almost continuously until March, 1981. By the end of April 1980, the U.S.N. had 37 ships deployed in the area, 22 of which were combatants. It stayed at about this level until March, 1981. Two CVBGs were maintained until 21 October 1981, when force strength dropped to one battle group, a level which is still maintained. Amphibious ready group deployments are regular, but short-lived. Indian Ocean deployments are losing their urgency with the decrease in the crisis level there, and the increase in crisis levels elsewhere in the world. [Ref. 15].

The Soviet squadron averaged about 20 ships until the crisis of 1979-80 when the average was about 30. [Ref. 16]. The Soviet force level was raised from 22 to 32 ships 26 March 1978. [Ref. 17]. In August, 1979, a submarine tender, along with an Echo-II class submarine entered Aden. [Ref. 18]. In 1980, a massive increase in Soviet submarine operations was observed in the Indian Ocean, probably in reaction to the turbulent events in the Middle East, and the increased American presence. Prior to 1980, Soviet submarine patrols had been limited to one diesel boat plus a four and one-half month annual excursion by an older nuclear

submarine from their Pacific Fleet. The year 1980, however, brought a nearly continuous Pacific Fleet nuclear submarine presence, an increase in diesel patrols, and two 'Victor'-class submarines from their Northern Fleet assets in the area. [Ref. 19].

> By mid-1982, Soviet ship count averaged about 25 and by year's end had fallen to approximately 20, with not more than two major surface combatants in the area for any sustained period. Within the first two months of 1983, the Soviets were maintaining only about 15 ships in the Indian Ocean, including a 'Kashin'-class guided missile destroyer and an 'Echo II' submarine. Most of the remaining ships are of the small auxiliary variety. [Ref. 20].

Although the Suez Canal is now open, making the area 'east of Suez' more accessible to the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, the majority of Soviet ships which deploy to the Indian Ocean make the long trip from the Pacific Ocean Fleet. [Ref. 21]. Through 1978, most Soviet naval shipping through the Suez canal was noncombattant. Due to bad relations with Egypt, the Soviets may not be able to count on it in a crisis. [Ref. 22].

The Soviet Navy also operates four permanent anchorages in the Indian Ocean: near Socotra Island off the African Horn; near the Comoro Islands between Tanzania and the Malagasey Republic; along the Cargados Carajos Shoals near Mauritius; and in the Chagos Archipelago near the U.S. facility on Diego Garcia. The Soviets also maintain 'bunkering rights' for naval auxiliaries (not combatants) with Mauritius and Singapore. [Ref. 23]. For limited

purposes, they can use Aden in the PDRY, Umm Qasr Iraq, Port Louis Mauritius, and Beira and Maputo Mozambique. They also occasionally use an anchorage off the Malidives. [Ref. 24]. Soviet supply points include Vietnam, Laos, Singapore, India, Iraq, the PDRY, Ethicpia, Mozambique, and Mauritius, giving them a logistics string from Vietnam to the South African Cape. [Ref. 25].

> There was some indication that the Russians may have intended originally to deploy a larger force to the Indian Ocean. The now defunct Soviet naval forces at Berbera in Somalia appear to have been designed to support a much larger naval force than the Russians normally deploy there. [Ref. 26].

With their expulsion from Berbera, they lost a lot of important items which have not been immediately replaceable. They had an airbase at Mogadishu, which was 1,000 miles south of Aden. So, in losing access to Somalia, they lost an extended finger of power to the south in 1977. [Ref. 27].

Soviet forces are now building naval facilities on the Dahlak archipelago, 50 miles off the coast of Ethiopia's major port of Massawa and 250 miles north of the Bab al Mandeb Straits. There has been considerable Soviet naval and construction activity there. A berthing area has been built with a large pier, and a floating dry dock is moored in the channel. This dry dock had originally been moved to Aden after the Soviet expulsion from Berbera. The Soviets are building additional facilities on Perim Island in the

Bab al Mandeb straits. [Ref. 28]. The Soviets presently keep 4 II-38 May aircraft in the PDRY, and 2 in Ethicpia. [Ref. 29].

Conditicns within the Indian Ocean basin makes many naval operations more difficult than under normal conditicns elsewhere. Naval cperations are hindered by extremely high salinity and high water temperaturas in the northern reaches cf the Indian Seas, while unusually low salinity is found on the eastern boundary. There are anomalcusly deep and shallcw channels, and abnormally high sound velocities. Underwater sound prcpogation is subjected to complex and irregular perturbaticns. In coastal areas, extremely high temperatures and severe dust storms are common. [Ref. 30].

The importance of reccgnizing the Indian Ocean's peculiar qualities and their influence or undersea communications, detection, and ranging cannot be overemphasized. This could confound Soviet ASW efforts, but they probably have the best survey data of any nation due to the great number of ship-days Soviet hydrographic research ships have made since 1968.

III. U.S. THEORIES: ACTIVE MISSIONS

This chapter will incorporate a selected sample of U.S. writers' theories of the active missions of the Squadron. The intention of the selection is to present the broad range of theories rather than to concentrate on one or two of the most popular.

A. DISRUPTION OF WESTERN SLOCS

The Squadron has a mission to disrupt/interdict Western sea lines of communication (SLOCs), specifically the oil routes leading from the Persian Gulf to the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan. [Ref. 31]. The scenario projected here is that the Soviets could disrupt shipping using raider tactics similar to those tried by the Germans in WWII, or could mine or blockade the straits of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb, or Malacca using surface ships, submarines, or aircraft. It implies a Soviet desire to impose economic sanctions on the West. Soviet leaders clearly stated during the Khrushchev era that one of the Soviet Navy's primary missions in any future war would be to stop the flow of vital merchant cargos to Western nations on the continent and to England, including irreplaceable material from the United States and oil from the Middle East. [Ref. 39]. This would intimidate

nations like Japan, who are wholly dependent on oil passing through the Indian Ocean.

The positions of Soviet bases in the Indian Ocean seem to indicate a desire to stand astride the SLOCs leading from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The proclamation of the state of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in November 1967 and of Socialist Ethiopia in 1977 gave the Soviets a position in the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean, centered on Socotra Island, and in the Red Sea. This position is ideally situated to interdict supertanker traffic from the Persian Gulf. With the increasing importance of the crude oil shipping lanes, and the reduction of importance of the Suez Canal due to the introduction of supertankers, the political climate in the Indian Ocean took on an explosive atmosphere [Ref. 40].

With respect to numbers of submarines, the Soviets are in a stronger position than were the Germans at the start of WWII. The Soviets are in an improving position with respect to access to facilities, and the concurrent eroding of U.S. access. If the Soviets can cut the sea routes around the Cape and starve NATO of oil, the only response would be nuclear war or surrender, because NATO today is too weak and too unprepared to offer effective conventional resistance. [Ref. 41]. The expansion of the Soviet fleet is particularly apparent in the Indian Ocean. The Squadron conducted simulated antishipping maneuvers there during OKEAN 75

exercises. The security of the West as a whole is thus endangered so long as the Western world depends so heavily on Middle Eastern oil.

The negative response to this scenario [Ref. 42]. is quite convincing. A Soviet blockade is neither conceivable outside the context of a general East-West war, or a cost-effective way of threatening the West's oil line. There is a current excess capacity in the world tanker fleet. A blockade would bring even enemies together against the Soviets, in a coalition of states with an interest in the continued flow of oil (both buyers and sellers). The Soviets would fight alone. Since a blockade could easily escalate to general war, the presence of a substantial proportion of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean rather than in the approaches to the Soviet Union would constitute inconceivable strategic folly. The Cape route is sometimes listed as a bottleneck, due to the African landmass and weather, [Ref. 47]. but in fact, it is not so, except that merchant shipping cuts corners in order to save time. The Soviets also depend on Indian Ocean SLOCs to resupply their Far Eastern forces and their Vietnamese allies, and would therefore be hesitant to invite Western retaliation against them.

There are a number of problems confronting the Soviet Admiral contemplating an interdiction campaign or blockade of Western SLOCs in the Indian Ocean. South of the Strait,

the SLOCs spread out, including the turn around the Cape of Good Hope. Because the best weapon for carrying out an anti-SLOC campaign is the submarine, it is apparent that the Soviet Navy would have to be augmented by numerous, cheap submarines to carry cut the campaign. The campaign would take more than the average 20-22 ships normally deployed to the Indian Ocean, and would require a major base; more than the anchorages and access agreements they presently enjoy. Due tc their lack of sufficient basing arrangements, they must limit their operations to areas in close proximity to the Soviet landmass in order to have access to adequate air cover. Without this air cover, their ships would be vulnerable, and a carrier battle group could destroy the bases and forces, thereby protecting the SLOCs.

As West German Admiral Edward Wegener points out, they would also need more than just support facilities. [Ref. 48]. According to Wegener, present Soviet facilities, etc in the Indian Ocean constitute maritime positions vice strategic positions. Soviet Indian Ocean positions are cut off from the Soviet land mass by the Dardanelles, the Sixth Fleet, and the Suez Canal. In case of a war, the Squadron would dry up, though extended facilities could prolong their capabilities somewhat. Because of this, the Squadron must limit its anti-SLOC campaign to a once-and-for-all encounter.

The global picture must also be considered. Originally, the Soviet Navy develcped in response to the nuclear threat from American carriers and SLBMs. Thus, its primary mission is the strategic protection of the Soviet heartland. To deploy their submarine fleet off the Cape, they would have to accept a fundamental weakening in their capacity to carry cut this primary strategic responsiblity. And, since interdictien cculd lead to a general war with the West, including possibly a nuclear war, they must be ready to effect their strategic defense of the primary theatre of the central front.

If the Soviets wanted to interdict the oil SLOCs to the West from the Persian Gulf, there are more efficient means for them to do so than to mount a naval blockade from ports in the Horn of Africa and/or southern Africa. They could sabotage cr bomb directly:

1. The small number of oil fields,
2. The even smaller number of power sources for the pumps and separators,
3. The even smaller number yet of collection points for tankers,
4. Or, the one Strait of Hormuz. [Ref. 49].

The mcst impcrtant thing to understand is that the sea lanes themselves are just one part of the transshipment line between the Middle Eastern wells and the Western consumers. There are eight majcr locations where the

transshipment could be interrupted, and the sea lanes are the least vulnerable of them all, at present. [Ref. 50].

Possibly the best spot for interdiction is the Strait of Hormuz. This is an especially attractive option following the invasion of Afghanistan, which puts Soviet tactical airpower within unrefueled range of the Gulf of Oman and the Hormuz strait. This power, in conjunction with Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean, may "confer upon the Kremlin the power to sever the West's economic jugular in the Gulf." [Ref. 51].

Looking at the problem in a broader context, interdiction in the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic offers "numerous advantages over an Indian Ocean exercise..." [Ref. 52]. These locations offer shorter lines of supply, vastly superior air cover, and easier access to major repair facilities. The most important advantage of the Mediterranean or North Atlantic over the Indian Ocean for interdicting Western SLOCs, though, is that it is easier to affect a rapid mission shift there from interdiction to strategic defense. By placing their fleet in the North Atlantic, they can defend Europe, they are closer to operational and logistic support, they can operate from more interior lines, and they can still threaten to cut off the oil to the West.

According to Ltcol Thomas Johnson and Lcdr Raymond Barrett, the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to be mined effectively. [Ref. 53]. A leaking crude oil tanker is less likely to take on water than it is to leak the oil. It is messy, but the ship actually floats better. Depending on the location of the explosion with respect to the ship, you get varying degrees of damage effects, and many tankers have ballasting and inerting systems to minimize explosive damage. The psychological damage is quite often the greatest gain of a mining effort. Modern mines use hydrostatic pressure, acoustic sensors, and magnetic signature sensors to activate them; and use intermittent activation devices and ship counters to counter sweeping efforts. "It is reaching the point at which each mine must be individually located and disarmed or blown up." [Ref. 54]. Given all the variables, the best estimate of a safe range from an ordinary mine would be a minimum of about ten times the draft of the ship. Over ten times the draft of the ship is the safe zone; four to ten times the ship's draft is the damage zone; and zero to three times the ship's draft is the danger zone, still subject to the explosion's location with respect to the ship. The Strait of Hormuz is generally about 300 feet deep along the Musandam Peninsula. Therefore, hulls drawing from 10 to 75 feet are within the damage range of the bottom. Moored mines are more dangerous, because they defeat this depth calculation,

though they are easier to locate and to sweep. In addition, the depth is such that the sinking of one ship in the Strait of Hormuz would not block, or seriously impede, shipping. In fact, it would take a rather large number of strategically placed sinkings to choke the channel. It is too deep to effectively bottom mine against any but the deepest draft ships. Compared with other options for mine warfare inside the Persian Gulf, Hormuz is a relatively poor place to employ naval mines. There still isn't any cure, for the psychological threat of mines, though education helps a little. A final note on the straits is that they are also too wide to be effectively controlled by coastal artillery. [Ref. 55].

Admiral Wegener calls for caution with respect to the SLOCs, however. If the Soviets could break through the barriers between the Soviet landmass and their Indian Ocean positions, they would become strategic positions, which would be very dangerous, particularly in terms of a long war scenario. This development of strategic positions would, "lead to a broad (Soviet) position from the Eastern Mediterranean to India on which to build sea power and limited mastery, depending on available resources." [Ref. 56]. To this end, Wegener believes that the Eastern Mediterranean will be the sea area of decisive importance in the East-West confrontation.

The Gulf case demonstrates the close interplay between the maritime posture and the balance of power on the landmass. A shift of the balance of land forces will have an important and perhaps decisive impact on the balance of maritime forces. The West's position of maritime superiority could rapidly shift to one of maritime inferiority if control of the landmass were to change, eg a Soviet military presence in Iran or a loss of Turkey to the West. [Ref. 57].

B. PROTECTION OF SOVIET SLOCS

The Soviets also have interests in maintaining the freedom of shipping in the Indian Ocean. This is one of the reasons that they have supported the idea of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, an idea initially proposed by the non-aligned nations. Due to the great distances between European Russia and the Far East, it is beneficial to the Soviets to maintain facilities and support ships along the route to support normal merchant shipping. [Ref. 58].

The Indian Ocean provides ready access to Southeast Asian markets and raw materials. The Soviet Union, like the West, is faced with an increasing need for access to Middle Eastern oil market and suppliers, as they are unable to fully exploit their own. [Ref. 59]. And, 45-50% of Soviet military and economic aid goes to Indian Ocean littoral

states. [Ref. 60]. Finally, in a subject to be explored more fully under the section on the People's Republic of China (PRC), one of the factors making the Indian Ocean increasingly a flash point in great power maneuvering is the importance of Soviet SLOCs to the Far East in case of a Sino-Soviet war. [Ref. 61]. With the severence of these SLOCs, the Soviets would be faced with a dependence on the undependable Trans-Siberian railway and the ice-littered northern route to support its Far Eastern forces and interests.

C. NAVAL DIPLOMACY

The primary objective of both superpowers in the Indian Ocean is to provide a political-military alternative to the other. To this end, the Soviets engage in naval diplomacy. [Ref. 62].

1. Soviet Policies and Aims in the Middle East

The four major thrusts of Soviet policy in the broader Gulf area, in support of which the SNIOS (as well as the military as a whole, and diplomacy) acts, are:

1. Discredit the role of the U.S. through propoganda and diplomacy,
2. Expand Soviet influence through the erection of a chain of pro-Soviet strongholds,

3. Support of revolutionary and subversive movements in the area,

4. Exploit the Islamic revolution in Iran. [Ref. 81].

Some see shrewd opportunism as the motive force behind Soviet foreign policy. [Ref. 82]. Others believe that Moscow's initiatives are more ad hoc in nature, rather than supporting the grand plan theory of Soviet global domination. [Ref. 83].

Geoffrey Jukes puts the Soviets' intentions in this way. SNIOS operations, in support of Soviet policy, are aimed at reducing Western influence along the entire Indian Ocean littoral. A dominant influence in the area would help in converting regional political systems into socialist systems. The main Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean lies not upon its sea lanes, but on its shores. These interests are to bolster non-aligned states, woo aligned states to non-alignment, and to encourage newly independent states in non-alignment. [Ref. 84]. So, a possible diplomatic mission of the Squadron is to offset any perceptions of unilateral Western influence in the area.

The Soviets cite the presence of U.S. naval forces and their movements as evidence of U.S. aggressive and "hegemonic" designs in the area. Their counters to the U.S. naval presence have been condemnations of American moves for "imperialistic control" of these strategic seas, and calls for the establishment of "zones of peace" in the Indian

Ocean and the Red Sea. They are concentrating on the PDRY in order to obtain naval base privileges at Aden, access to facilities at Socotra, and to upset Oman, a friend of the U.S. and the owner of the Musandam peninsula. Their basic aim is to disrupt neutral or pro-western governments with revolutionary movements in order to erode the Western power base they perceive in the region.

One commonly held theory to explain the Soviets' desire to gain control over some part of the Indian Ocean littoral coastline is the desire, expressed by Peter the Great, for "warm water ports." At that time, however, Russia's only coastline was on the Baltic, which was dominated by Sweden and Poland, and on some northern ports, which were icebound for about six months of the year. And, ambition was never unlimited. At its highest, it aspired to a stake in the Mediterranean, and, more realistically, to control of the entry to the Black Sea. [Ref. 85].

Another oft-cited story to explain the Soviets' southward imperialist expansion is the Molotov-Ribbentrop talks of 1940. The real story behind this is that, to draw Soviet attention away from their impending East European invasion, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop proposed a four-way entente that would eventually divide up the British Empire. The proposed partition would have given each country the British territories directly to their south. The Soviets would receive the area in between Africa and the

Pacific "in the general direction of the Indian Ocean." The Soviets agreed on discussions, but no agreement was ever made. Instead, Stalin pushed for clarification on Finland and the Balkans, brushing aside the Indian Ocean sphere as relatively unimportant. [Ref. 86].

Providing military support for allies and friends has always been an important Soviet motivation in countries such as Somalia. Among the Soviet motivations for supporting Ethiopia in its war against Somalia in 1977 may have been its interest in acquiring the right to base its fleet at two Ethiopian ports on the Red Sea, Assab and Massawa, as replacements for the excellent facility it lost at Berbera, although support for Ethiopia is what cost them access to Berbera in the first place.

> In recent years, the Soviet Union has acquired naval facilities at Aden and is thought to have stockpiled arms there. A twenty-year friendship treaty has been signed, and several thousand Soviet, Cuban, and East German military advisors are present. In 1977-78, over $1 billion in arms, 17,000 Cuban troops, and 1,200 Soviet advisors were sea and airlifted to Ethiopia. [Ref. 87].

Dismukes and McConnell view the Squadron's place in Soviet policy in this way.

> Moscow views the struggle as political in essence, but taking numerous forms--ideological, economic, and diplomatic, with the diplomatic definitely comprehending the military-diplomatic. In the Soviet view, the U.S. Navy is their main obstacle in the Third World, the main instrument of the U.S. Navy is the carrier task group, and the main Soviet instrument to counter it is an anti-carrier task group, the crucial unit of which is a cruise-missile submarine, supplemented by torpedo-attack submarines. In the Indian Ocean, the impact has clearly been more politico-military and local than strategic, if

only because (as the Soviets acknowledge themselves) this body of water is not, and has not been, a Polaris patrol area. [Ref. 88].

2. Naval Diplomacy

Even though Atlantic and Indian Ocean deployments (as measured in ship-days) have been consistently smaller than those to the Mediterranean, the effort devoted to diplomatic visits in these two regions has, just as consistently, been proportionately higher. The relative intensity of the Indian Ocean effort is particularly striking, and would appear to confirm the prominence of political concerns in the Squadron's mission structure.

Despite the heavy emphasis on naval diplomacy by both superpowers, though, "the super-power naval presence in the Indian Ocean has had no significant impact on events in the Gulf." [Ref. 89].

> Nonetheless, these individually capable ships provide an important element of Soviet presence in that area, and could be used to limit the freedom of action of Western forces during periods of crisis less than a major conventional war between the superpowers. [Ref. 90].

Naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean is attractive, because it is a contest for influence where the rewards are relatively great and the risks are relatively small. Making well-timed appearances in Third World ports, or deploying in well-publicized opposition to the U.S. Navy, the Soviets can claim to be protecting developing states from the forces of imperialism. In the Indian Ocean, the Soviet presence has

raised the stakes in the game of naval diplomacy. In the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the Soviet task forces probably couldn't have stopped the U.S. carrier task force from making a military intervention, had that been their aim, but it could have made it very costly, both militarily and politically. The Soviets have taken a lesson from the British, who showed that the best way to control the littoral states was to control the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. Due to Soviet successes at naval diplomacy (or Western failures), the U.S. may be seen as the "crippled giant", likely to let local friends "go down the international drain." [Ref. 91].

Kevin Jordan puts forth an interesting thesis to explain why the relatively small SNIOS has been so influential. The basis of naval diplomacy is credibility; the foundation of credibility is that vital interests are at stake. Soviet vital interests are regional in scope and limited in nature, covering primarily defensive alliances with buffer states contiguous to the borders of the Soviet Union. For effective naval diplomacy, the soviets must develop significant economic and diplomatic associations in regions beyond the areas contiguous to its borders. <This follows the idea that narrow military powers as the main instrument of foreign policy will surely fail in the long run>. The Soviet interests in the Persian Gulf, as in the Mediterranean, are peripheral. Even so, in the Indian Ocean

it is the Soviet fleet which has the political advantage. Comparative SNIOS weakness in relation to the the U.S.' Indian Ocean presence is offset by the proximity of some 50 divisions near the Iranian-Afghan border. U.S. naval power couldn't presently prevent direct Soviet ground force intervention. The Soviet capability to blitz the Persian Gulf without defeat offsets the absence of a vital interest. The secondary purpose of the SNIOS is to extend the political power of the Soviet land forces massed in the vicinity of the Iranian-Afghan border. Naval power flexibility diminishes its political potency with respect to ground forces, because they are indicative of a lesser degree of decision; because they can be recalled much easier. [Ref. 92].

According to Farer,

> The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean conceivably may enhance the prospect for the overthrow of existing governments on the Arab side of the Gulf; Soviet ships might serve as a shield for radical insurgents or some newly installed radical regime threatened with a seaborne intervention, mounted or organized by the West in conjunction with regional allies.

This constitutes a modest Soviet tripwire, as in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. Some of the SNIOS' probable major goals are:

1. Gaining political capital through showing the flag,
2. Maintaining a political tripwire,
3. Signalling the will and capacity to match any escalation in Western activity. [Ref. 93].

Ccercive diplomacy involves a show of force to encourage and show support for friendly governments, to sway non-aligned governments, and to threaten unfriendly governments. Soviet ports in the region enhance, to a degree, the image and reality of the Soviet Union as a great or global power by symbolizing the Soviet presence, and by facilitating the protection of Soviet clients. Naval strength in the Indian Ocean helps in this process, but it is not a major part. "In the hierarchy of Soviet ranking terminology, the Navy is consistently characterized as only an 'important' instrument of policy; it is not a 'most important', much less a 'main' instrument." [Ref. 94]. Some courses of possible Soviet naval action, within the limits of their capabilities, are to exercise gunboat diplomacy against the West and the PRC, to encourage and support internal subversion, and to actively support a client state in a war with another Third World state <Ethiopia>. [Ref. 96].

3. Specific Country Relations

The follcwing are present or past formal Treaties of Friendship between the USSR and some Indian Ocean states:

1. Egypt: annulled by Egypt 15 March 1976,
2. Somalia: 30 October 1974 - 1977,
3. PRC: 1950 - April 1979,
4. India: 1971,
5. Iraq: 1972,

6. Mozambique: 1977,

7. Ethiopia: 1978,

8. Afghanistan: 1978,

9. Vietnam: 1978,

10. PDRY: 1979.

India, Iraq, the PDRY, and other Indian Ocean states have so far apparently rebuffed Soviet efforts for permanent base rights. Yet, Soviet-Cuban military success in Ethiopia both warns Persian Gulf states and intimidates them. There have been some reports of military assistance to Iran, and a cutoff of military aid to Iraq by the Soviets. [Ref. 97]. Following their expulsion from Somalia in 1977, the Squadron's ships were staged in Aden. On 19 November, 1970, the Indian Minister of External Affairs stated total opposition to the establishment of naval bases in the Indian Ocean by either the U.S., the U.K., or the U.S.S.R.

4. Chronology and Specific Cases

In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Navy was doctrinally committed to defense of the Russian coastline, or in direct support of ground forces operating on the Eurasian land mass. The Soviet Navy began naval diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean in support of Arab friends. Operations in the Mediterranean were soon extended to the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic littoral of Africa.

In the early 1960s, Soviet crews flew Egyptian TU-16 bombers against Royalist forces in North Yemen, but the real start of Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean began in 1968. The opening diplomatic gambit in 1968 was a good-will visit to India by the Commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Two of the three ships under his command also visited Somalia, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf.

The new Squadron made a port visit to Somalia in December, 1969 to show its support for the new regime of Siad Barre. In April of 1970, it again made a port visit to Somalia amid rumors of a possible coup attempt against President Barre by the Ethiopians. There is little evidence that either visit actually helped prop up the Barre regime, but it was indicative of the Soviets' willingness to use a show of force to support its friends in the Third World. Late in 1970, the Russians landed a survey team on the island of Socotra, where they were reportedly building a naval communications station and other facilities. [Ref. 98]. A U.S. Congressional delegation could not confirm this, however, when they visited the Island in that year.

On 15 January, 1971, during a Commonwealth Heads of Government conference in Singapore, two Soviet warships passed by in full sight, lending support to British Prime Minister Heath's argument of a Red menace. Two Soviet auxiliaries repeated the passage the next day, loitering

offshore for a couple of hours. Some possible reasons for these occurrances are:

1. Oversight or accident on the part of the Soviets, though that doesn't explain the loitering offshore by the auxiliaries,
2. To cause a disruption in the proceedings, provoking Heath, but not the African leaders,
3. It was Heath who planned it to give emphasis to his speech, though this still doesn't explain the actions of the auxiliaries,
4. A combination of the first three.

After the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War broke out, the naval contingents in the Indian Ocean built up to record levels. The U.S. had 14 conbatants and auxiliaries, the Soviets had 26, and the British had 21, though the British were in the Indian Ocean, not in response to the crisis, but to assist in their withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. The normal Soviet relief force entered the Indian Ocean in December and the decision was made to maintain both forces on station, effectively carrying out a reinforcement.

The following is a chronology of the important naval events of the war:

1. 12/3: West Pakistan conducts an air strike against India, and India invades in the East,
2. 12/5: The Soviet relief force (DDG/MSF) enters the Indian Ocean,

3. 12/6-7: First Soviet task force leaves Vladivostok (Kynda, Julett, and Foxtrot),
4. 12/9: First Soviet TF, with a Kynda CG and an SSM submarine, sighted in Tsushima Strait,
5. 12/10: U.S. TF 74 forms with Enterprise and Tripoli, and moves to a holding area east of Singapore,
6. 12/12: Dacca is evacuated of all foreign personnel, and the British TF, standing by, withdraws,
7. 12/13: Second Soviet TF leaves for the Indian Ocean (Kresta-II, Echo-II, and 2 Foxtrot),
8. 12/14: TF 74 enters Malacca,

   The Soviets end surveillance of British TF, which exits the Indian Ocean,
9. 12/15: TF 74 enters the Bay of Bengal,
10. 12/16: West Pakistan surrenders in Dacca,

    TF 74 diverts to southwest of Sri Lanka,
11. 12/17: Armistice signed,
12. 12/18: TF 74 picks up its first tattletail,

    Second Soviet TF transits Malacca.

Each Soviet task force was configured for anticarrier warfare, consisting of 12 SSM launchers and 6 SAM rails per task force. It is fairly clear that the first Soviet task force was meant to counter the British carrier, and that the second was a counter to the Enterprise task force. It would seem that both naval forces accomplished what they set out to do. The U.S. forces set the political stage

which deterred the Indians from invading into West Pakistan, and the Soviet forces raised the stakes enough that the U.S. forces were deterred from intervening on behalf of the Pakistanis. It is urimportant whether the U.S. intended to intervene or not (it is doubtful, considering the location of the bulk of the Indian forces in the north, around Kashmir). What is important is that the Soviets reacted forthrightly, and could claim to the world that they had faced down the "imperialists."

Following the 1971 War, the Soviets offered to clear the Bengali harbors of Chittagong and Chalna of mines and wreckage. For the Chittagong mineclearing operations, the Soviets promised a six week completion time, but it took one and one-half years. They then reneged on their promise to clear Chalna. The Soviet commander, Admiral Zuyenko, dragged his heels, partly to use the Soviet Navy to build Soviet influence in Bangladesh. They were embarassed, however, when a U.N. team cleared Chalna in under five months. In this operation, the Soviet Union conducted its first ever case of gunboat diplomacy other than the traditional diplomatic port visit. They completed the minesweeping phase in Chittagong, but only after the Indian Navy had already completed a substantial portion. The overall operation was more like an extended port call of one and one-half years.

Then, in March of 1973, the Soviets supported the Iraqis when they invaded portions of Kuwait, with a naval port visit, accompanied by Admiral Gorshkov. In the summer of 1973, the SNIOS effected the transfer and support of up to 200 Yemeni troops from Aden to the eastern provinces, possibly to take part in the Dhofari rebellion against the Sultan of Oman.

During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Indian Ocean contingents were again reinforced. The U.S. sent the Hancock carrier task force to protect the shipping lanes, while the Soviets sent what amounted to a token force, including a Sverdlov cruiser, and an Echo-II and 2 Foxtrot submarines. Part of the reason for the Soviet buildup may have been in support of President Breshnev's visit to India at the same time. What was impressive about the Soviets' handling of this crisis was that, at the same time as they were responding to the U.S. moves in the Indian Ocean, they were simultaneously covering three U.S. carrier task forces and one amphibious task force in the Mediterranean with 4 separate anticarrier task forces. In addition, for the first time they took part in operations ashore. The Navy assisted in a major resupply effort, helped evacuate Soviet citizens from Arab countries, collected intelligence inside the war zone, and lent credibility to Soviet threats of intervention with airborne troops. What is important to note is the comprehensiveness with which they were able to

act on multiple fronts, and against many targets simultaneously.

An even larger minesweeping force than was used in Bangladesh in 1971 was used to conduct clearing operations in the Strait of Gubal, south of the Suez Canal in 1974. At first, asked for assistance by the Egyptians, the Soviets had set forth a list of conditions for their help. When the U.S. commenced a major effort to clear the Canal, however, the Soviets offered to sweep the Strait for free. The helicopter cruiser Leningrad took part in this operation, conducting helicopter minehunting operations in order to counter the publicity the Americans were getting for conducting similar operations. So important was the venture to the Soviets that both Admiral Gorshkov and Marshal Grechko attended Leningrad's pre-sailing ceremony at Sevastopol. Between 1972 and 1974, these minesweeping operations accounted for as much as one-third of the total number of ship-days accumulated by the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean. [Ref. 99].

During the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia, the SNIOS had the following missions:

1. Sea control in the southern Red Sea and the western Gulf of Oman,
2. Protect shipping to Ethiopia,
3. Assist in transporting Cuban military personnel to Ethiopia,

4. Protect Soviet personnel,

5. Conduct reconnaissance,

6. Conduct shore bombardment operations.

In July 1978, intelligence analysts said that Soviet access to Ethiopian facilities should eventually more than compensate for the loss of those in Somalia. [Ref. 100].

In March 1979, the Minsk battle group rounded the Cape of Good Hope, called at Mauritius, and operated off Socotra, supported by Soviet land-based aircraft out of the PDRY. The battle group eventually continued on to the Pacific, continuing a trend in transfers to the Pacific Fleet from the Northern Fleet, making port visits in route.

D. SPACE PROGRAM

The polar projectory of the Soviet space program passes over the Indian Ocean from Madagascar to the Arabian Sea. The Soviets often deploy Space Event Support Ships (SESS) to the area for the purposes of tracking and recovering satellite capsules. [Ref. 101].

E. BUREAUCRATIC LEVERAGE

In the Soviet Union, the Navy is of secondary importance to the Army, which makes it more difficult to obtain funding in a world of limited resources. In this respect, if Admiral Gorshkov can convince the military establishment

that an Indian Ocean presence is necessary, he would be able to extract more funding with which to build up the Navy in general. [Ref. 102].

F. FISHING FLEET

The Soviet Union depends heavily upon its fishing fleet to supply the protein, needed by the population, that poor harvests denies. A significant percentage of this comes from the Indian Ocean, specifically from off the eastern coast of South Africa and Madagascar. To support the required fishing fleet, the Soviets have concluded a treaty with the government of Mauritius, whereby they can fly in relief crews for the ships. They also maintain anchorages off Durban South Africa and the coast of Madagascar, and have anchored tankers in the Mozambique Channel. In recent years, the Indian Ocean provided them with a fifth or more of their catch. [Ref. 103].

With the rise in unilateral coastal-state claims to living resources, the occasions requiring naval escorts for fishing fleets have grown exponentially. They haven't sent Soviet naval ships to protect their fishing fleet off South America, possibly due to U.S. sensitivity; a lack of secure, friendly port facilities; or fear of an actual confrontation with Latin navies, with its attendent costs. [Ref. 104]. These conditions have not been as prevalent in the Indian

Ocean fishing grounds to date. Therefore, increased naval protection of fishing fleet assets, to the degree necessary, can be assumed.

G. SEIZURE OF TERRITORY

According to N.P. V'iunenko, there are two main types of amphibious operations. The first is the seizure of ports and naval bases in enemy territory for Soviet naval usage or for denial to the enemy. The second is to overcome resistance at "broad water barriers, particularly estuaries, sounds, and channels" to maintain a high rate of ground advance. [Ref. 105].

> A look at the southern border of the U.S.S.R. in the Trans-Caucasus area reveals what drives the historical Russian desire to gain direct access to the Indian Ocean, which no doubt contributed to the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in late 1979. [Ref. 106].

It must be presumed that the Director is indicating the factor of proximity to the so-called warm-water ports refuted by Jukes in the section on naval diplomacy.

> A more likely prospect <than invasion of Iran, Pakistan, or a peninsular state> is the lightening employment of limited Soviet military force to assist local pro-Soviet forces in seizing power, or <u>to preempt U.S. forces in a crisis area.</u> (emphasis mine) [Ref. 107].

Admiral William Crowe speaks of a possible move by the Soviets towards the Persian Gulf in this way:

> Repeatedly during the nineteenth century, Czarist Russia sought to bring Iran within its sphere of influence in order to gain a warm water outlet to the Arabian Sea and shorten the lines of communication to its empire in the

> Far East. <Actually, the Russians worked more with the Persians, vs the Cttomans, rather than against them>. In short, Soviet control of the Persian Gulf oil fields would give the Russians enormous power in the world economy, and enable them tc meet their own energy requirements far mcre efficiently than they can from the Far East. The Soviets continue to lcok at the world in terms of political situations that are 'ripe' for intervention; the Persian Gulf's dynamic situation may very well cffer them such an opportunity.

The Soviet Army has 160 divisions, 6 in Central Asia, and 24 in the southern USSR. The southern and central ground forces are at 1/3 strength, but can be reinforced rapidly and flexibly due to excellent infrastructure from Eurcpean Russia to the Baku region. They have a military air transport force of over 1,500 fixed wing aircraft and 3,660 helicopters. Reverses in Somalia and Egypt could cause them to shift attention away from the Suez-Red Sea route toward the traditional objective of a direct outlet on the Persian Gulf.

> Without immediate and successful intervention by Western naval and air forces, the Soviets would be in an excellent pcsition to overcome the Iranian air force, introduce airbcrne infantry units, and extend the reach of mechanized units onto the shores of the Gulf.

Or, they could occupy northwestern Iran, and join with the Iraqis in order to seize Kuwait. Or, "--a strong military foothcld on the Horn cf Africa would place the Soviets and Iraqis in an ideal position to exert pressure on Saudi Arabia." The Preponderance of soviet power to the north could present the West with a fait accompli. Soviet air and ground forces in the southern Soviet Union are outside the

scope of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace talks, yet give them an advantage in rapid power projection to the Gulf. The Soviets don't see the possible agreement as limiting their own projection of power to the Indian Ocean littoral, especially the Horn of Africa. Yet, U.S. options for resupply/reinforcement of the Persian Gulf assume that, in times of crisis, the U.S. will establish and maintain naval superiority in the Western Indian Ocean." [Ref. 108]. Our problem in the Persian Gulf is to stop their fait accompli prior to our arrival, as they can use strong proximate forces and client local forces. [Ref. 109].

Even if the U.S.' alternative energy programs were successful, the impact of leaving the Gulf would alter the world balance of power in favor of the Soviets, as the Gulf states became subject to the dictates of Moscow's military power. Soviet economic gains through even partial control of Gulf oil would quickly translate to greater military spending and ability to manipulate the policies of energy-dependent Third World countries, to say nothing of Western Europe. With Gulf oil no longer an asset available to NATO, the alliance itself would forfeit the ability to fight a sustained conventional war and, in effect, dissolve as a credible factor in world affairs." [Ref. 110].

Citing Tsar Peter's Imperial testament, and the Stalin-Hitler Pact, the Soviets <u>may</u> have an imperial aim toward reaching the warm waters of the Indian Ocean.

[Ref. 111]. Since Czarist times, the rulers of Russia have probed southward, seeking access to the southern sea lanes that are new major oil routes and thus a lifeline of the industrialized world. Instead of seeking only warm water ports, the Soviets are attempting to control access to the oil riches of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. [Ref. 113]. Stalin felt the area was important enough to include in his 1939 pact with Hitler, which recognized the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf as the center of aspirations of the Soviet Union.

H. WARFIGHTING

This section is pretty much a catch-all. Some ideas seem to defy categorization as any of the above theories. Therefore, the definition here of warfighting is an active mission which deals loosely with conflict situations and doesn't closely fit into any of the above theories.

According to Nitze and Sullivan, the implications of the Soviet Union's landlocked geography for its navy are that it must keep its ships close to home, support them with auxiliaries over long distances, rely on foreign bases, or consider them expendable in times of conflict. It follows from this that the Soviet Navy should be reluctant to commit major elements of its fleet to remote areas during a crisis.

Although Soviet naval fleet support is weak, the Soviet merchant marine, whose ships ply all the seas, also furnishes supplies, including fuel, to the navy. In the event that hostilities seemed probable, Soviet naval units could be sent out from the confines of coastal waters, to escape throughthe chcke points before the war began. In the event of war with the West, they would like to seize the oil fields and interdict seaborne support and reinforcements to the area. Their naval potential is for oil SLOC interdiction, anti-CVBG warfare, and as an anti-Diego Garcia force. This is risky, though, especially against Diego Garcia, without air cover. If nothing else, it could draw off a lot of U.S. naval forces, which could be better used elsewhere. Finally, they could interpose themselves between U.S. naval forces and an area of crisis, blocking an intended intervention. The Indian Ocean is a source of excellent naval access to the South Atlantic, and the Pacific Oceans. Oil is not the only SLOC of potential interest. The West might need a SLOC to support a large task force or other military operations along the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, or Sea of Aden. These SLOCs would be "long, exposed, and lacking in receptive way-stations." [Ref. 114]. Aircraft launched missiles, launched from the Turkmen SSR (460 miles from the Persian Gulf) or Afghanistan (300 miles from the Gulf of Oman), are a serious threat to U.S. naval forces there. [Ref. 115].

Direct Soviet naval actions are presently precluded by: detente, the strength (or lack of it) of deployed forces, their comparatively meager infrastructure, a lack of air support, an inability to augment their forces after the war starts, and the ability of the West to hold hostage their fishing and merchant marine fleets. One thing they can do, though, is to gain expertise in tropical operations and the logistics associated with long-range naval operations. [Ref. 116].

The Soviet Navy has a greater need for, but less assured access to littoral support facilities. Their ships have less per unit endurance and less habitability space than U.S. ships. They are one-shot SSM ships, generally. They have inferior amphibious support capabilities, and a more limited underway replenishment capability. One major mission for the SNICS today is to gain operational experience in the region. [Ref. 117]. Yet, they are becoming less dependent on shore bases with the development of increased replenishment at sea capabilities. [Ref. 118].

The transfer of ships to the Pacific Fleet, from which deployments to the Indian Ocean would be made, effectively removed them from participation in crises in the Atlantic Ocean or the Mediterranean Sea. In short, the Soviets consciously fragmented their naval power in order to conduct operations in the Indian Ocean. The Squadron conducts three primary surveillance patrols: one in the Bab el Mandeb

Strait, one in the Strait of Hormuz, and one near the U.S. base on Diego Garcia. [Ref. 119].

I. SUMMARY

1. Disruption of Western SLOCs

Of all the theories listed in this chapter, it appears that the disruption of Western SLOCs is the one that generates the greatest amount of debate. It is also the one cited most often by authors that put the Squadron in an aggressive light, and that are sounding the call to arms in order to meet a growing menace. Those who dispute this theory, on the other hand, tend to view the Squadronas natural instrument of policy by a superpower, and that there is little to be alarmed about, short of a general East-West war, in the Indian Ocean.

It appears that those who argue against a disruption mission have a stronger argument. There is little doubt that a Soviet man-of-war, upon sighting a U.S.-flag or allied merchantman during a time of open hostilities, would interdict it, as long as it didn't interfere with another more vital mission. They would not, however, perform such a mission in peacetime, and would be unlikely to dedicate units to it during wartime. During peacetime, such an action would precipitate open hostilities, something which the Soviets have historically been extremely hesitant to do.

In the context of a hot war, or in the planning to start one, it is again unlikely that the Soviets would dedicate units to interdiction of merchant shipping. The main naval fear of the Soviets is that ofU.S. carriers or SSBNs striking the Soviet homeland. For them to put units in the Indian Ocean to defend against that is not an unreasonable expectation, but that is a different mission. For them to put units into the Indian Ocean to interdict merchant traffic while the carriers and SSBNs could strike at them from other oceans is unreasonable to expect. The main naval wars will be in the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the West Pacific. Until those are resolved in the Soviets' favor, if ever, merchant interdiction will not be pursued by them in any ocean, including the Indian Ocean. When they do decide to interdict, they are more likely to do so closer to the end of the sea lanes, rather than at the beginning. This allows them the greater mission flexibility, since the Indian Ocean is logistically distant from the Soviet Union.

The Soviet military in general seems to plan predominantly on a short war scenario. Their problems in Afghanistan, however, may cause them to rethink this. They do not expect to be pushed back, or to be stopped in their attack. In a short war scenario, the disruption of SLOCs is of a lesser importance. In this scenario, assuming a Soviet victory for the moment, they could easily interdict at will following the conflict. During the conflict, the mission of

the Soviet Navy is to destroy the projection power of the U.S. Navy. Insofar as they could do that and interdict the merchant traffic, they would do so. But their forces in the Indian Ocean are vulnerable, with very limited air support. Admiral Wegener's discussion of strategic positions vice maritime positions is indicative of this. This condition will remain until the Soviets control the Suez Canal, the Turkish straits, and the Mediterranean. Once this is done, interdiction will be easily accomplished, but it also would likely be indicative of a Soviet victory overall. To restate the conclusion then, the Soviets are very unlikely to disrupt Western SLOCs during peacetime, and will not be very inclined or able during open conflict, short of having achieved a general victory elsewhere.

2. Protection of Soviet SLOCs

The section on the protection of Soviet SLOCs is much shorter than the one on disruption of Western SLOCs. The main reasons that it is not cited often by the authors is that it does not directly affect U.S. vital interests in the area (in fact, it is a vital Soviet interest), and that there is little argument against the idea that it is a mission of the Squadron. None argue the fact that the northern sea route and the Trans-Siberian railway are undependable, due either to weather or to possible Chinese interdiction. None argue the large amount of Soviet shipping that plies the Indian Ocean sea lanes in support of the

Soviet Far East, or in trade with its allies in southern and Southeast Asia.

The only question is the priority of the mission. It is difficult to imagine it to be of low priority. The size and makeup of the normal Squadron [2] are such that it is not unreasonable to think that protection of Soviet sea lanes is one of the Squadron's main missions. In fact, as shall be seen more fully in chapter V, the Soviets themselves are quick to point out just how important the Indian Ocean sea lanes are to them. This is sufficient reason to station a squadron in the Indian Ocean.

3. Naval Diplomacy

There is no argument about the diplomatic mission of the Squadron. Much of the discussion revolves around what the policy of the Soviet Union is, which the Squadron supports. In a bipolar, zero-sum mode, this can be seen as being hostile and a threat to U.S. interests. In a multipolar, non-zero-sum mode, it is the natural and expected action of a great power. The Squadron's naval diplomacy mission was best summed up by Farer when he described its goals as:

1. Gaining political capital through showing the flag,
2. Maintaining a political tripwire, and

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[2]This is discussed fully in chapter II.

3. Signalling the will and capacity of the Soviet Union to match any escalation in Western activity.

The writings of the other authors say the same thing, in essence.

4. Space Program and Bureaucratic Leverage

There is no argument that one of the missions of the Squadron is to support the Soviet space program. They normally maintain a space event support ship on station, and they often make pickups of satellite capsules, as well as tracking orbiting platforms. One added function is that these ships can also do double duty in surveillance of Western Indian Ocean activities.

The bureaucratic leverage theory was very interesting, but not very convincing. The Soviet generals are intelligent enough to see through a smoke screen that has no substance. If there is substance there, then they are reacting to that substance, and not the smokescreen. The section on the space program was very short, because it is generally accepted and not vital to either the West or the Soviets; while the section on bureaucratic leverage is very short, because it was cited by only one author in any capacity, and appears to have little substance or importance. Even if it was true, it would make little difference to the Western planner, who must react to the very real presence it would lead to, rather than the unapparent workings of the Kremlin.

5. Fishing Fleet

There is no argument that the protection of the fishing fleet is a mission of the Squadron. There is also no argument that the Squadron has not seen a need to carry it out. It occasionally acts in support of the fishing fleet, but the Squadron's units are normally located in the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean, while the fishing fleet is located in the southwest quadrant, along the Mozambique Channel, and east of Madagascar.

6. Seizure of Territory

This mission, in the Indian Ocean, would be executed in the context of a Soviet land operation in a southward direction from the Soviet Union toward the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf waters. This operation could be focused anywhere from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia. Yet, it is generally recognized that a Soviet invasion from the Caucasus or Soviet Central Asia is the least likey form of a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East.

It is generally accepted that, in the Soviet Union, the Navy is the junior service to the Army. Because of that relationship, one of its major missions overall, in addition to affecting a strategic defense of the Soviet homeland, is to act in direct support of Soviet ground operations. With this in mind, it is apparent that, in the context of a Soviet land operation in the Middle East, the Squadron would act in support. The Squadron has a small amphibious

capability which could be used to seize and hold strategic choke points until a larger, more permanent force could arrive. This is of a very limited nature, though. The amphibious lift capability numbers up to two LSTs, carrying some 400 Marines. In most cases, more could be done with the Soviets' impressive airborne troop capability.

This mission, then, deals with a least-likely scenario. The Squadron's capabilities in its regard are of a very limited nature, and the job could be done better by other forces. Seizure operations within the scope of the Squadron's forces are more likely to be classified under naval diplomacy. Their operations in support of the Dhofari rebels in Oman are indicative of this, although they did not involve the actual seizure of territory.

7. Warfighting

In a hot war scenario, the Squadron's missions are likely to be:

1. Interdiction of Western reaction forces,
2. Act in an economy of force role, to diffuse the Western naval effort,
3. To destroy Western naval forces,
4. To control choke points.

These missions are of a tactical nature, and may shift according to the nature and course of the conflict. The discussion from here is not of a mission nature, but of an operations analysis nature, and is thus outside the scope of this discussion.

IV. U.S. THEORIES: REACTIVE MISSIONS

A. ANTI-SSBN

This theory states that the Squadron was initially in response to a possible strategic threat emanating from the Arabian Sea and the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean. [Ref. 120]. It is one of the most popular theories to explain the Squadron's presence, at least in its early years. According tc the theory, a Polaris submarine with the 2,500 NM (stated range) A3 missile cculd perform its most efficient targeting from the above listed areas, as well as from the Gulf of Guinea on sub-Saharan Africa's Western ccast. From the Arabian Sea, the Polaris-launched A3 cculd simultaneously cover targets [3] in the European and Asian Soviet Union, and in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). According tc Soviet writers Marshal Sokolovskii and Cherednichenko, "The first priority mission of naval operations in the oceanic and sea theatres will be the destructicn of atomic missile submarines." [Ref. 125]. Admiral Gorshkov, the Soviet naval chief, said

> We also cannot remain indifferent to the expansion of the basing of U.S. nuclear-powered submarines and carrier forces . . . in the Indian Ocean, and in other

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[3]This includes most major industrial, military, and political centers.

> areas of the world ocean, for all of this powerful and widely dispersed military organization is directed against the USSR and the countries of the socialist community. [Ref. 126].

In 1963, the United States concluded an agreement with Australia to build a VLF communications station on their Northwest Cape. The Soviets must certainly have seen this as a preparation for conducting submarine operations in the Indian Ocean, particularly because VLF is primarily used for communications with patrolling submarines. A look at the map of the Indian Ocean shows the Northwest Cape to resemble an arrow pointed in the direction of the Arabian Sea. The question arises that, if the U.S. did not plan to operate SSBNs in the Indian Ocean, why build the Northwest Cape communications station at all? In 1964, the Soviets, in an apparent attempt to use diplomacy to protect them from the strategic threat emanating from the Indian Ocean, made a proposal to the United Nations that the Indian Ocean be made a nuclear-free zone. Then, in 1966, the British and the Americans signed an agreement whereby the U.S. would build a naval base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago, approximately 2,000 NM from the Gulf of Hormuz. Due to these events, the Soviets were forced to implement a naval presence in the Indian Ocean to counter the strategic threat.

Some authors minimize the importance of the anti-SSBN role of the Squadron. [Ref. 127]. They point out the distance that must be traveled from Rota, Holy Loch, and Guam to arrive on station in the Arabian Sea (and now, Rota is no longer used as an SSBN base, increasing the total distances that must be travelled). For a 60 day patrol, the transit time would be prohibitive to the most efficient operation of the size-limited Polaris fleet. Then too, there is no evidence that the U.S. Navy has used the Arabian Sea as an SSBN patrolling area. This is a fact that even the Soviets appear to recognize. [Ref. 128].

The idea that the the Trident SSBN would be more useful than the Polaris in the Arabian Sea does not stand up to scrutiny. The Trident is available in even more limited numbers than is the Polaris/Poseidon fleet, and is home-ported in the continental U.S. It is therefore of even less efficient use in the Arabian Sea due to the reasons cited above. And the Trident missile (as well as the future C-5 missile) allows the submarine to operate closer to U.S./Western-controlled air and sea space, which makes more useful such ideas as SSBN bastions. With these capabilities, it seems unlikely that the Trident would be sent half way around the world to do something that it could do just as well in friendlier, sheltered waters. And, the value of SSBNs stationed in the Indian Ocean is limited by the anti-ballistic missile agreement and by Trident's range. [Ref. 129].

A final reason that the U.S. Navy is unlikely to use the Arabian Sea as an SSBN operating area is the fear of offending the PRC. This is a thought that has not received much press, but which should be seriously considered. In February, 1972, President Nixon visited Peking, opening up the road to normalized relations between the U.S. and the PRC. This normalization has progressed, to date, to the point that the U.S. sees the PRC as an ally in containing Soviet expansionism. One of the reasons given by the Polaris theory for Arabian Sea SSBN patrols is that a submarine in the Arabian Sea could simultaneously cover targets in both the Soviet Union and the PRC. In light of the greatly improved relations between the U.S. and the PRC in the last decade, it is unlikely that the U.S. would take the chance of offending the Chinese by posing a threat to them from the Indian Ocean.

As the Sino-Soviet breach grew, the Soviets couldn't understand why the U.S. didn't decrease its Polaris forces in the Pacific. They felt that B-52s would be sufficient against inadequate Chinese air defenses. Since the U.S. didn't decrease its Polaris forces, then, they must all be targeted at the Soviet Union. There weren't enough Soviet Far Eastern targets to account for all the Polaris forces, therefore, there must be plans to send some of them into the Arabian Sea, where they could reach new targets. Add this to the U.S.' prioritization of the Pacific forces for the

receipt of the new A-3 missile, and the 1963 announcement of the new VLF station cn the Northwest Cape of Australia, and there appears to be a reasonable justification for the Soviets tc anticipate such U.S. SSBN deployments to the Indian Ocean.

The first A-3 deployment took place in September, 1964. This led to the Soviets' 7 December 1964 memorandum tc the U.N. titled, "On Measures for Further Easing International Tensicn and Restricting the Arms Race." This memorandum proposed that the Indian Ocean be a nuclear-free zcne. Hints of a link between this and A-3 are:

1. The only two seas mentioned as nuclear-free zones were the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean,
2. Passage would hurt U.S. targeting opportunity, but would little effect those of the USSR, especially with respect tc the Indian Ocean,
3. The memorandum was presented to the U.N. less than eight weeks after the ouster of Khrushchev, pointing to its origin under his leadership,
4. The mention cf only the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean makes clear the Soviet belief in the possibility of successful negotiations on those areas. [Ref. 130].

Imprcved SSBN and carrier-based threats were a great impetus for the Soviet Navy's extending to forward deployment in crder to fight, starting in the Mediterranean. The

same reascns that pushed them into the Mediterranean also pushed them into the Indian Ocean, except that:

1. The Indian Ocean SSBN threat was a potential one, while the threat from the Mediterranean was current,
2. They had no friends in the Indian Ocean with already developed naval bases,
3. That made per-ship deployment more expensive in a time of tightening finances,
4. The Black Sea Fleet was already fully extended with its Mediterranean requirement,
5. The A-3 missile of the time only had one warhead, fully occupying them with Far East targets,
6. The Indian Ocean threat at the time was only from SSBNs, the detection of which would take a great deal of resources, for a threat which was only a potential one,
7. There was a desire to not change the Britain's mind on withdrawing from east of the Suez, or to push the U.S. to replace them, or to push the British into buying its fifth Polaris submarine. [Ref. 131].

Yet still, operating experience would be nice to have in case the potential threat eventually did show up. In 1968, the fears of littoral states about the U.S., due to the Vietnam War, were going up; the A-3 missile began to receive multiple warheads, which raised the stakes and potentially freed some Pacific Polaris submarines for operating in the

Indian Ocean; the British announced their impending withdrawal from the Indian Ocean region; and the new government of Aden proved to be not unfriendly to the Soviets. The Polaris threat created the necessity for the Soviet deployments, while the rest provided the opportunity. [Ref. 132].

> The introduction of the first of the new Trident nuclear-missile submarines into the U.S. Pacific Command, covering the Indian Ocean as well as the Pacific, this year <1980>--probably in September--underscores American strategic interest in the waters between Indonesia and the east coast of Africa. [Ref. 133].

This will probably intensify the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Some analysts believe that U.S SLBM submarines operate in the Indian Ocean on a routine basis, although this is disputed. The Ombai-Wetar and Makasar-Lombok Straits are deep enough for safe, unimpeded underwater transit. In 1976, the Indonesian Foreign Minister confirmed that his government was engaged in negotiations with both the Soviets and the Americans over safeguards concerning underwater movements of nuclear submarines using the Indonesian straits. In February 1976, in a spy scandal in Indonesia, an officer in Indonesia's hydrographic office was convicted of passing charts and documents about the Indonesian straits to the Soviets, which could be used to counter U.S. ASW measures. It is believed some of the SLBM-armed U.S. submarines to be targeted against the Soviet Union may use the Indian Ocean", beginning in 1984. [Ref. 134].

The Soviet shift to forward deployment came in two phases. The first lasted through 1967, and culminated with a Soviet presence in the Mediterranean after gaining access to Egyptian ports and airfields after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The second phase of the shift began in 1967, and addressed the threat of the A-3 Polaris missile. Long-standing Soviet suspicions about the Arabian Sea as a patrol area for U.S. SLBM submarines were fueled by the 1963 VLF agreement for North West Cape in Australia, and by the British-American agreement on the use of Diego Garcia. [Ref. 135].

Polaris deployments could take place to the Indian Ocean, but would cost much more than they would achieve. Nevertheless, the Soviets must treat it as an option they must be able to counter. The SNIOS maintains a constant ASW capability, but it is not predominant. From 1974-1975, under 20% of SNIOS ships in any given month had an ASW capability. [Ref. 136]. As long as Trident may deploy to the Indian Ocean, the Soviets must maintain an ASW capability there. [Ref. 137].

Crew endurance and reenlistment rates set limits on the cruising range. It would also take more submarines to ensure one was ready and on station at all times. Yet, "Despite efforts to discount it, the ASW hypothesis retains a plausible role in any comprehensive explanation of Soviet interests." [Ref. 138]. They may :

1. Not appreciate fully the ways the U.S. determines cost-effectiveness,
2. Be planning for the technical worst-case scenario, as we tend to do, or
3. Be laying the foundation for an unpredictable future. [Ref. 139].

After all, detente could break down, ABM restraints could fall away, or there could be a breakthrough in ASW, making it useful or necessary to expand SLBM patrol areas. The U.S. might decide to shrug off the political costs of a submarine base in South Africa. In addition, it takes a great deal of time, effort, and expense to establish the political relationships, physical infrastructure, and the experience necessary to operate effectively in a new environment.

> Whether or not it influenced the initial decision to deploy east of Suez, development of an antisubmarine capability now appears to be a significant part of the Russian mission there. During the worldwide naval exercise called OKEAN, conducted by the Russians in 1975, this seems to have been the only function assigned to their Indian Ocean squadron. [Ref. 140].

B. POST-U.K. VACUUM

This theory states that the Soviets were "drawn" into the Indian Ocean by the political and military vacuum produced when the British withdrew from "east of the Suez". [Ref. 141]. It is not a coincidence that the Soviets moved

naval forces into the Indian Ocean in 1968 following the coming to power of a Marxist-oriented regime in Aden in 1967, and the decision by the British to withdraw from east of the Suez in 1968 after lengthy debate in Parliament. The Soviet Union has made no secret of its security interests in the Middle East, along its southern borders. [Ref. 143]. The new regime in Aden made it possible for Soviet naval units to have access to local facilities, although the Yemenis have consistently refused a formal access treaty. The British withdrawal then provided the necessary room for the Soviets to conduct their naval diplomacy. An additional incentive for the Soviets to expand naval forces into the Indian Ocean was the relative level of success met during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, in which, for the first time, they were able to operate on an even basis in opposition to the U.S. Navy.

The pattern of Soviet initiatives shows them pursuing a pattern of trying to replace the British as controllers of the strategic straits. A Soviet naval squadron entered the Indian Ocean from Vladivostok only two months after the British announced their decision to withdraw. [Ref. 144]. They stayed for four months.

C. THE CHINESE THREAT

The Sino-Soviet split began to take form about 1961, and became official by 1963. Good relations between China and Pakistan, and between China and various groups in Southeast Asia, began to worry the Soviets. They feared that increased Chinese influence in southern Asia might threaten their Indian Ocean SLOCs. In 1962, border problems between the Chinese and the Indians flared up into open warfare. The mauling the Indians took gave them some proclivity toward dealing with the Chinese' enemies, the Soviets. In 1965, the Indians fought a war with the Pakistanis which ended in a stalemate, and demonstrated to the Indians their need for more modern forces. During the 1965 war, the Chinese maintained good relations with the Pakistanis, and the Americans and British imposed an arms embargo on the Indians. This drove the Indians even further into the arms of the Soviets. In 1971, this close relationship became official, with the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. This treaty with India was an open warning to the PRC to not interfere in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani crisis. One of the missions for the Soviet task forces leaving Vladivostok December 6-7 may have been a warning to the Chinese. [Ref. 147]. The Soviets sold the Indians 8 Petya frigates, 8 Osa missile boats, 8 Foxtrot submarines, and 4 Polocny amphibious ships. In return, the Indians leased to

the Soviets the port of Vishakhapatnam, which they modernized and developed into a submarine base. Naval facilities were also made available at Port Blaire in the Andaman Islands. This is a direct link between a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the Sino-Soviet rivalry. It must be pointed out, however, that it was also related to the U.S. position in the Indo-Pakistani conflict, and that the Indians remain vociferously non-aligned, despite the Treaty and the accessible facilities.

> It had to be assumed that in the event of a war with China, the Trans-Siberian railway would be cut, and that the Far Eastern Front would have to be supplied by sea. This introduced the requirement to protect such shipments from the Chinese Navy, which includes the third largest submarine force in the world. But this threat to shipping reached back to the north-western parts of the Indian Ocean, where it could be posed by chinese forces using friendly bases (eg Pakistan or, in those days, South Yemen), by U.S. forces, or even by regional navies. [Ref. 148].

The Soviets grew to fear U.S.-PRC collusion, particularly as the Sino-Soviet breach widened. [Ref. 150].

The Soviets have a fear of the continued growth of Chinese seapower. They are in competition with the Chinese for leadership in the Afro-Asian world. The Chinese are a colored race, don't require base rights in exchange for their favors, and their ideology fits Africa better than does the Soviets'. This makes them a tough diplomatic adversary for the Soviets in the Third World. [Ref. 151]. The Soviet Union additionally seeks to encircle China. China's diplomatic presence in East Africa, as well as the

imperatives of maintaining a non-aligned status discourage the granting of large-scale port facilities to the super-powers by Third World states. [Ref. 152].

D. INTERDICTION OF/REACTION TO U.S. FORCES

The SNICS' mission is to interdict U.S. forces on their way to support or resupply land forces and allies in the Middle East (ie Central Command forces, or RDJTF), or to provide a counterpresence to U.S. naval forces reacting to crises or engaging in naval diplomacy. [Ref. 154]. An example of this took place during the Bengali War of Secession in 1971, where the Indians invaded East Pakistan to aid the Bengali liberation forces. A British force comprised of the carrier Eagle, commando carrier Albion, and escorts and support ships were in the Arabian Sea supporting the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. They responded to the war, and moved toward the Bay of Bengal. The normal Soviet relief force arrived and began to shadow the British forces. The U.S. formed a CV task force around Enterprise, drawing them from operations off the coast of Vietnam, and sent them into the Indian Ocean. The Soviets, anticipating this American reaction, responded soon after with a task force built around a Kresta I and a Kashin, which shadowed the Enterprise task force, and was presumably ready to interpose themselves betweent the U.S. forces and

the crisis. The war, however, was over before everyone was fully in place, and the extra units on both sides withdrew. The Director of Naval Intelligence cited an increase in the number of warships deployed to the Indian Ocean, including cruise missile submarines, saying that they served to counter U.S. carrier forces, as well as to support their clients. [Ref. 160]. This underscores the interdiction/ reaction mission, as well as the previously discussed mission of naval diplomacy.

> The Soviets have naval requirements in the Indian Ocean, since, in the event of world war, they most probably plan to move south to control the Gulf area, and naval forces will be needed in the seaward approaches to fend off assaults by U.S. strike carriers and amphibious groups. [Ref. 161].

One of the factors upon which the U.S. strategy, of effecting a delaying action in central Iran against a Soviet invasion, is dependent is, "the ability of U.S. naval forces to prevent the interdiciton of the Strait of Hormuz by Soviet submarines and Backfire bombers." [Ref. 162].

Soviet policy is to keep a rather small naval force in the Indian Ocean that can be quickly enlarged in times of crisis. [Ref. 163].

> Given the Soviet perception of naval power as an extension of land power, the primary purpose of the Soviet Indian Ocean force is to protect the seaward flank in the event of a Soviet invasion of the Gulf states. [Ref. 164].

Their role is to play an interpositional role, deterring Western naval forces from Third World interventions. [Ref. 165].

Backfire bombers would stand prepared to threaten any U.S. naval action, or at least to deter it. The Soviet Navy could attempt to mine the approaches to Abadan as well as the strait of Hormuz. [Ref. 166].

The Soviets increased their naval and air activity in the Indian Ocean and adjacent land areas due to a concern over the U.S. buildup of naval facilities on Diego Garcia, and fears of unrest in Iran and Afghanistan spilling over the borders into the Soviet Union. [Ref. 167]. In general, they reacted to the 1979-1981 crisis period in the Indian Ocean by increasing their naval strength there.

> Subsequent to the release of the U.S. hostages by Iran, and coincident with the gradual reduction of U.S. naval forces, the Soviet naval posture in the Indian Ocean underwent a similar reduction. [Ref. 168].

E. SUMMARY

1. Anti-SSBN

Much of the writing on this mission seems to go to great length detailing its importance to the Soviets, and then go on to say that there is no evidence of the U.S. patrolling the Indian Ocean with SSBNs. The general conclusion to be wrought is that one of the Soviets' initial reasons for entering the Indian Ocean was a fear of the SSBN threat. In the 1960s, the U.S. built its VLF communications station on Australia's Northwest Cape, and came to an

agreement with the British over the development of Diego Garcia. These were both developments that the Soviets could and should have seen as preparations for Indian Ocean SSBN deployments. The prioritization of the Pacific Fleet SSBNs to receive the then new A-3 ballistic missile was also an indicator.

As time went by, though, and the anticipated threat never arrived, the anti-SSBN mission lost some of its frenzy. The Soviets admitted that U.S. SSBNs hadn't deployed to the Indian Ocean. The cost of maintaining the large numbers of platforms necessary in the Indian Ocean to meet that threat was prohibitively great,* so there is a state of uneasy tension surrounding the anti-SSBN mission. The Soviets, with their hydrographic ships in the Indian Ocean, are preparing for a future contingency. The U.S. has not put them to the test yet, but a change of philosophy or strategy could quickly do so.

2. Post-U.K. Vacuum

This has been stated as a theory to explain the Soviets' naval extension into the Indian Ocean. The main stimulus for this conclusion is the coincidence between the British withdrawal and the Soviet extension. The fact is, though, that the Soviets maintain the Squadron only at great

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*That cost is even greater now with Trident, and the resulting enormous increase in the area of ocean which would have to be covered.

cost, a cost which was even greater during its early years. Filling a vacuum is not a very satisfying reward for such an investment. Instead, the Soviets had interests of their own in the region, some vital and some not, and the British withdrawal simply made it possible to move in earlier than they would have otherwise. It is unreasonable to believe that the Soviet Union, a superpower with important interests in the Indian Ocean region and a growing blue-water navy, wouldn't have eventually made the extension, even in the absence of a British withdrawal. In fact, one of the reasons the Soviets were so careful at first was to avoid provoking the British into delaying their withdrawal. In this way, the mission of the Squadron is less as an instrument of zero-sum great power conflict than it is an instrument of Soviet policy, whether it is working in a zero-sum mode or not.

3. The Chinese Threat

The PRC, along with the Western bloc, is one of the Soviet Union's two main rivals for world power. China has the world's third largest submarine force, and is closely allied with Pakistan, which stands along the Soviets' vital Indian Ocean routes, and has a warming relationship with the U.S. This is one reason for the Soviets' fervent desire to maintain its relationship as the main ally of India, an enemy of both the PRC and Pakistan. The Soviets have made deliveries of naval hardware to India, have used access to

some Indian bases (on a limited basis), and acted to interdict U.S. and British reaction forces during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. Most of the posturing in this southern Asian arena has been diplomatic, but the Soviets use their naval forces in suppcrt of this diplomacy. The stimulus for this, in additicn tc a normal drive to increase its influence in the world in general, is the Sino-Soviet conlict. Not only does the PRC threaten the Trans-Siberian railway and the Indian Ocean sea lanes, but it is the main reason the sea lanes are important in the first place. The Scviet Indian Ocean SLOCs are a major route for supplying the 45 or so Soviet ground divisions along the Sino-Soviet border, as well as their bases at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk.

4. Interdiciton cf/Reaction to U.S. Forces

This appears to be the Soviets' primary reactive mission. They reacted to the British and the Americans during the 1971 Indc-Pakistani War. They reacted to U.S. carrier forces in the Indian Ocean during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. They reacted to anticipated U.S. fcrces in ccnnectien with the Iranian hostage crisis. They built up the Squadron further in anticipation of a U.S. reaction to their mcve into Afghanistan. They have thus shown a consistent pattern cf reacting to the movements cf U.S. naval fcrces in the Indian Ocean in connection with a crisis. Yet, the reaction is as much a functicn of the crisis as it is of the American forces. Soviet reaction

forces in the Indian Ocean have generally left the region before the U.S. forces which they were reacting to.

A case in point is the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. The crisis was developing long before the Soviets assembled their task forces. Once the Indians invaded East Pakistan, there was no doubt of their ability to easily defeat the Pakistanis, so there was no need for the Soviets to send SSM platforms to help them. The departuer date of the second Soviet task force from Vladivostok indicates that they began to assemble it prior to the U.S. action of marshalling a carrier task force east of the Strait of Malacca. After the conflict was ended, the Soviet task force left the Indian Ocean before the U.S. task force did. The pattern, then, is a reaction to the combination of crisis and U.S. or Western action, or anticipated action, with withdrawal upon the removal of one of these determinants. There have been crises in the Indian Ocean without a Soviet reaction. There have been strong U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean without a Soviet reaction. There has <u>not</u> been a case of a crisis <u>and</u> a U.S. response or <u>anticipated</u> response without a Soviet reaction. These, then, are the keys for the U.S. planner: crisis, U.S. response, or a reasonable expectation of a U.S. response.

V. SOVIET WRITINGS

Rather than attempt to organize this chapter by theory or subject, it appears that the least distracting method is simply to take each of the six authors (seven sources), and give a summary of the points in their articles salient to the present discussion. Ideas and quotations from the articles have been chosen in such a manner as to derive the essence of the authors' points. Some typical Soviet-Marxist rhetoric has crept into this, but this was allowed when it lent emphasis to what the author was saying. Without it, it was feared that the ideas would not properly be communicated. At the end of the chapter, table I correlates the Soviet writings with the U.S. writers' theories.

The first author, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov is the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, and is therefore the man most responsible for the operations of the Soviet Navy. He wrote two books, both of which were reviewed for salience to the present discussion. The remainder of the authors cited in this chapter were drawn from the Center for Naval Analysis Abstracts. The method used was to review each article written by a Soviet author with the words "Indian Ocean" in the title. The title search went back to the beginning of 1979, and articles which proved to be of little usefulness were left out of this chapter.

A. GORSHKOV

In the last 3 years, some 1,000 Soviet combatants and auxiliaries have visited the ports of 60 countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. More than 2,000,000 Soviet officers and non-rated men have visited the shores of foreign states.

> We also cannot remain indifferent to the expansion of the basing of U.S. nuclear-powered submarines and carrier forces on the Japanese Islands, in Italy, in the Indian Ocean, and in other areas of the World Ocean, for all of this powerful and widely dispersed military organization is directed against the USSR and the countries of the Socialist community. [Ref. 169].

The Indian Ocean is playing an increasing role in the economies of the developing countries of South Asia and Eastern Africa. In the countries of its basin live some 1,000 million persons. It is the third largest ocean, with an area of almost 75 million square kilometers (over 20% of the world ocean). The Indian Ocean takes about a tenth of the world's shipping. The economic importance of the Indian Ocean lies essentially in the fact that along it run world trade routes linking Europe and America with South Asia, Eastern Africa, Australia, and the oil-bearing regions of the Near and Middle East. Across the Indian Ocean run the routes from the Black Sea and Baltic ports of the USSR to the ports of the Far East and also to India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Burma, and other countries. The Indian Ocean accounts for some 5% of the world catch of sea products. [Ref. 170].

B. ALEXEYEV

The West practices gunboat diplomacy in the Indian Ocean in order to reap profits from its rich territory. The permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean has become an integral part of the aggressive strategy of world imperialism. These actions are patently anti-Soviet in nature. In this light, consider the construction of U.S. bases, etc in the very proximity to the southern borders of the USSR, or the permanent presence in the Indian Ocean of warships with nuclear missiles capable of hitting Soviet territory, and the resultant opportunities for violating the inalienable right of the Soviet Union to freedom of navigation in the open sea. It should not be forgotten that the Indian Ocean is the sole warm-water route linking the Soviet ports of Europe and the Far East.

The idea of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was first brought out at the Third Non-aligned Nations Summit, held in Lusaka in September, 1970. This called for freedom from great power competition and military bases, either ground, or naval and air. At the suggestion of Sri Lanka, the zone of peace idea was adopted by the 26th session of the U.N. General Assembly on 16 December, 1971. These debates, though, were erroneous in equating the USSR with the U.S. as a cause of the tension in the Indian Ocean. The USSR has no military bases in the Indian Ocean and never

strived to acquire them. It does not deploy its strategic navy there, and does not resort to intimidation of littoral states with its naval strength.

Foreign bases in the Indian Ocean are a major threat to the security of the region. "The Soviet Union has never had and has no intention now of building military bases in the Indian Ocean." [Ref. 171].

Since 1972, the U.S. sent large operational naval forces to the Indian Ocean nearly twenty times for periods of up to two months. Presently, several dozens of U.S. warships, including aircraft carriers, are permanently stationed there. The government of Mauritius is the legitimate owner of Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia can launch B-52 strategic bombers, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, and has silo launchers for ballistic missiles.

China has been sabotaging the peace of the Indian Ocean through increasing tensions, and through propoganda, claiming the aggressive nature of India. With the development of its navy, China would seek its broad application on a global scale, and for its political purposes in the region. The South Fleet of China alone consists of 300 combatants, and continues to expand.

Provacative U.S. actions in reaction to national liberation movements include:

1. Henry Kissinger not ruling out the use of military strength to ensure the continued delivery of oil in late 1974,

2. In 1977, Presidential Directive 18 sanctioning the creation of a mobile force for brush-fire wars, the beginning of the Rapid Deployment Force,
3. In 1979, there was talk of forming a U.S. Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean.

The main goal of these operations is to seize major oilfields of Southwest Asia, and to hold them until the arrival of the regular units. According to Presidential Memorandum 51, a "limited use" of nuclear weapons in the Middle East is envisaged. [Ref. 172].

C. LADOZHSKY

The U.S. broke off talks with the Soviet Union in 1978 on limiting and reducing military activity in the Indian Ocean. In the zone of peace talks, the USSR stressed that the principle of freedom of navigation should not be violated. The USSR was finally able to vote in favor of the zone of peace resolution at the 32nd Session of the U.N General Assembly, due to a softening of the wording about the rivalry of the great powers.

The Chinese hegemonists are making a determined effort to rearm Pakistan, along with the U.S. The PRC's military presence in the Indian Ocean will inevitably lead to the further destabilisation of the already tense situation there.

Soviet naval units in the Indian Ocean have never resorted tc a demonstration of their power and have not threatened the security of the littoral states. The Soviet military presence there has always been much less than that cf the U.S. and its allies.

The Soviet Union also has political interests in the Indian Ocean. It supported freedom from colonial domination, and now supports the new states against imperialism, neo-cclonialism, etc.

Major Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean include:

1. Preventing the appearance of a strategic threat from the southern direction, particularly carriers carrying nuclear weapons,
2. Sea routes linking the USSR with the littoral states,
3. Sea routes linking the European USSR with the Far East,
4. The USSR conducting work in connection with space exploration,
5. Part of the USSR's research of the World's Ocean is conducted in the Indian Ocean. [Ref. 173].

D. LUGOVSKCI

The U.S. Fifth Fleet operates out of Diego Garcia. It also has a number of peripheral bases, including Simonstown in South Africa. The U.S. has involved its West European

allies as well, leading to a geographical escalation as a part of its new strategy. Over 2,500 nuclear warheads have been emplaced on U.S. ships patrolling the seas bordering on Asia and Africa. [Ref. 174].

E. SEMYONOV

The waters of the Indian Ocean and its shores and islands are relatively close to the USSR, considering the radius of the effectiveness of modern strategic attack weapons. Moreover, the only year-round sea route connecting the eastern part of the USSR with the Soviet Far East passes through the Indian Ocean.

Zbigniew Brzezinski developed the concept of "arches of instability" in the region of the Indian Ocean, the meaning of which can be understood as nothing other than a call for the use of armed force against the peoples of the coastal countries, who are striving to attain social progress or emancipation from neocolonial dependence. [Ref. 175].

F. YEFREMOV

Naturally, the peace-loving forces cannot react indifferently to the Pentagon's threatening actions. The U.S. is attempting to turn back the march of history with its gunboat diplomacy. In 1974, U.S. Secretary of Defence Schlesinger threatened to seize the oil fields in the region

by force if the oil exporting states "hurt the industrial world." As of April of this year <1980>, the total number of U.S. military vessels in the Indian ocean reached 31, including the Coral Sea, Nimitz, Kitty Hawk, and Midway aircraft carriers, and missile cruisers and warships with 24,000 servicemen on board. One part of them patrols the Bahrain area, another the western portion of the Arabian Sea, and a third the region near Karachi.

The "Carter Doctrine" is an offshoot of the dream of John Foster Dulles to extend the "nuclear umbrella" everywhere possible. The government of Kuwait, for example, declared that there exists no threat, other than the American one, to the region. The American threats are more than sabre-rattling. [Ref. 176].

G. DISCUSSION

It is difficult sometimes to wade through Soviet polemics, but Ladozhky's article summed up nicely the Soviet views of their interests in the Indian Ocean. There was a great deal of talk about Western and Chinese imperialists, hegemonists, neo-colonialists, etc., but the following outline fairly well sums up the real heart of the issue in the Soviets' minds.

1. Preventing the appearance of a strategic threat from the southern direction, particularly carriers carrying nuclear weapons,

2. Sea routes linking the USSR with the littoral states,
3. Sea routes linking the European USSR with the Far East,
4. The USSR conducting work in connection with space exploration,
5. Part of the USSR's research of the World's Ocean is conducted in the Indian Ocean. [Ref. 177].

Table I and table &push2 on the following pages clearly show a predominant concern with the presence of U.S. forces. In fact, all six of the authors cite it. Two of the authors cited the legitimate political concerns of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean, which was used to correlate with the naval diplomacy mission. None gave credit for U.S. legitimate political concerns in the Indian Ocean, but called all U.S. military operations in the region imperialistic and militaristic. The double standard even goes so far as to have led to the Soviets not signing the Zone of Peace agreement for a number of years due to the language it once had calling the Indian Ocean as an arena of great power conflict. It is interesting here that all cited the U.S.' "imperialist" presence, but only two cited their own legitimate interests.

The second most stated concerns were those of protection of Soviet sea lanes and of an SSBN concern, with four authors citing each. The sea lanes were considered important for the supplying of their Far Eastern provinces, and

for trading with important Southeast Asian friends. In the absence of a specific source of the nuclear threat, a mention of that threat was considered to include an SSBNs. Admiral Gorshkov specifically mentioned nuclear submarines, though not SSBNs by name. Ladozhsky links the nuclear threat with carriers, but not with submarines. Yefremov mentions carriers and missiles, but doesn't state a nuclear nature. From this, it appears that the Soviets are very concerned with strategic attack from the Indian Ocean, whether from carriers, submarines, or cruise missiles. The specific launch platform is less of a concern than the threat itself. It would be reasonable to assume that, should an SSBN threat become apparent, they would pursue it with the same vigor they do the surface threat, which is present.

The Chinese threat was mentioned twice, in vehement language, including referenced to Chinese military power present in the Indian Ocean. The space program and the fishing fleet were both mentioned once.

One trend that can be generalized from the writings is that the Soviets defend their legitimate interests in the Indian Ocean, as in the right to freedom of navigation on the high seas, and their rights as a sovereign nation to pursue these interests. At the same time, they apply the double standard to label any similar U.S. action as militaristic, implying a lack of legitimate U.S. interests in the

region. The third generalization arises out of the mission areas that are <u>not</u> cited by the Soviet authors. These are the areas that could be labelled as aggressive, including disruption of Western SLOCs, seizure of territory, warfighting, and filling a political vacuum left by the British. To be "filling the vacuum", they would ostensibly be taking Britain's place as the regional imperialists. The final mission that was not mentioned was that of bureaucratic leverage, which would obviously not be mentioned, even if it were true. One mission area mentioned by Ladozhsky, but not the Western writers, was that of supporting the USSR's research of the world ocean, part of which is conducted in the Indian Ocean. This could be related to the fishing fleet, but is sufficiently vague to warrant its own mention.

TABLE I

SOVIET-AMERICAN AUTHOR CORRELATION

Theory	Author GORSHKOV	ALEXEYEV	LADOZHSKY
II.A			
II.B	X	X	X
II.C			X
II.D			X
II.E			
II.F	X		
II.G			
II.H			
III.A	X	X	
III.B			
III.C		X	X
III.D	X	X	X

TABLE I (Cont.)

Theory	Author: LUGOVSKCI	SEMYONOV	YEFREMOV
II.A			
II.B		X	
II.C		X	
II.D			
II.E			
II.F			
II.G			
II.H			
III.A	X	X	
III.B			
III.C			
III.D	X	X	X

VI. SUMMARY, ANALYSIS, AND CONCLUSIONS

The Carter administration, through 1978, had been pursuing the idea of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. This is an idea that was and is being pushed by the non-aligned movement, the United Nations third world contingent, and the Soviet Union. After the fall of the Shah in 1979, however, the U.S. reversed its position with respect to the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and began to build its military capability in the area through the augmentation of U.S. naval forces in the region, the formation of the Rapid Deployment Force concept, and a push for increased basing rights in the region in places like Diego Garcia, Berbera, and Mombasa. [Ref. 178].

This was indicative of a greater need for an increased U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf region. The Carter administration adopted the idea, and the Reagan administration has been striving to bring plans for the increase to fruition. The Soviets, on the other hand, have a much lesser need for such an increase. From air bases in Soviet Georgia and Azerbaijan, or from Afghanistan, they only have to fly 600 or 1200 miles, respectively, to important Gulf regions. Meanwhile, their airborne division capability is approximately four times that of the U.S.

[Ref. 179]. Soviet land access to the Persian Gulf is approximately the same as that of its airborne forces in distance. The U.S., meanwhile, is approximately 12,000 sea miles from the Gulf around the Cape of Good Hope. In view of this, it is obvious that the Soviets don't need the sea access as much as the West does. Therefore, they are still pushing strongly the zone of peace idea, as was discussed in chapter III. In the absence of outside forces, then, the Soviets don't need naval forces in the Indian Ocean for a warfighting capability. During wartime, they need naval forces in the Indian Ocean for reacting to U.S. military moves in the region (ie interdiction), or for operating in direct support of land-based forces, or for reacting to opportunities.

It is now time to return to the three questions posed in chapter one:

1. To what degree is the Squadron's mission active, or reactive?
2. To the degree that it is active, what are its missions?
3. To the degree that it is reactive, what is it reacting to, and what patterns, if any, can be discerned?

So, is the Squadron's mission active or reactive? The active missions of the Squadron, discussed in chapter one, were disruption of Western SLOCs, protection of Soviet

SLOCs, naval diplomacy, space program, bureaucratic leverage, fishing fleet, seizure of territory, and warfighting.

Disruption of Western SLOCs is definitely one of the Soviet Navy's missions. It is unlikely, however, that they would attempt to create a blockade or raid the merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean, short of general East-West hostilities. Except when operating relatively close to air bases in Afghanistan, and assuming that they don't gain access to operational air bases elsewhere in the region (there is a possibility in Ethiopia), the SNIOS is vulnerable to Western attack.

In addition, such operations would require inordinate numbers of platforms, necessitating a drawdown of forces elsewhere in the world. This is something the Soviets are unlikely to do. Their primary mission is to defend the Soviet homeland. If operating an anti-SLOC campaign in the Indian Ocean would detract from their ability to perform the strategic defense mission in more important areas, such as the Central Front of Europe, then they are extremely unlikely to do it. As the Soviet Navy follows a trend of procuring smaller numbers of more capable platforms, this unwillingness to send large numbers of ships to the Indian Ocean will grow stronger, particularly in the absence of a direct, present threat. And, they could expect that such a campaign in peacetime would quickly lead to a condition of

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



war. Therefore, a Soviet anti-SLOC campaign would only take place as a part of a warfighting campaign.

Even in a hot war situation, the Soviets are unlikely to invest an inordinate effort in cutting the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. By cutting the lanes in the northern Atlantic or the Mediterranean, Soviet naval forces retain an extra degree of flexibility that they don't have in the distant waters of the Indian Ocean. They can change missions quickly and fall back in defense of the home waters, if necessary. Of course, this requires first winning the battle of the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, but any attempt to conduct a long-term sea lane interdiction campaign in the Indian Ocean would also require a victory in the Mediterranean. Admiral Wegener made the point when he described maritime positions vs strategic positions.

If all this is true, then why do the Soviets appear to be trying so hard to place their forces astride the sea routes in the Indian Ocean? There are several answers to this question:

1. That is where they have been granted facilities access, first in Berbera, Aden, and Umm Qasr, and then in Dahlak and Aden. Even in Aden, though, they haven't been able to get the unrestricted access that they desire,
2. It is the closest place in the Indian Ocean to the Soviet Union and the Squadron's sources of supply,

3. It is proximate to the Middle East and Western forces, affording the opportunity to conduct surveillance with relatively little effort,
4. It is proximate to the Suez Canal/Red Sea basin, which they would have to control in wartime in order to make their Indian Ocean presence a viable one, for whatever missions they might have in mind,
5. Related to the Suez Canal, it sits astride their own sea lanes to the Soviet Far East.

There is little debate over whether protection of Soviet SLOCs is one of the Squadron's missions. A great deal of Soviet shipping transits along those lanes, and they constitute the only truly reliable method of resupplying their Far East forces at the present time. The Soviet writers summarized in chapter III made innumerable references to the importance of these lanes to the Soviet East Asian effort.

There is likewise little debate over the Squadron's naval diplomacy mission. The only real debate is the Soviets' general policies and aims in the region which the Squadron is supposed to be supporting. Soviet Middle Eastern and African policy is beyond the scope of this discussion, but a few basic policy goals may be accepted:

1. The discrediting of the U.S.,
2. Support of revolutionary and subversive movements,
3. Encouraging non-alignment in pro-Western states,

4. Encouraging pro-Soviet inclinations in non-aligned states,
5. Providing an alternative to the West,
6. Protecting friendly states from subversion and outside aggression.

Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean are heavily geared toward naval diplomacy because of the preponderance of the Third World on its on its littoral, because of its closeness to the Middle East, and because it is relatively safe with respect to the possible provocation of a higher-level conflict with the West.

There is no doubt of the space program mission. The Squadron has included Space Event Support Ships (SESS) a majority of the time. The Soviet writers also mentioned this mission as being important.

The bureaucratic leverage theory is interesting, but not too convincing. It is possible that Admiral Gorshkov uses the Indian Ocean as a perceived threat in order to wrest funding away from the other services, but the threat has to be convincing for the ploy to work. The generals, after all, are not blind. If the threat is convincing enough for the Admiral to get the funding, then it is the perceived threat and not the bureaucratic process that is important for us to consider, at least at this level of analysis.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union considers the Indian Ocean to be vital to its ability to supply its citizens with adequate protein. It is not so obvious, however, how much of a naval presence, if any, is necessary to protect the fishing fleet. There have been incidents involving claims of territorial waters against the fishing fleet outside the Indian Ocean basin, but none of them required a Soviet naval task force to remain on station to protect them. The main requirement here, outside of a major incident between the Soviet Union and a littoral state over fishing, is in the realm of naval diplomacy. This diplomacy helps to gain aggreements for the Soviet Union by which the fishing fleet can operate more efficiently. Some examples of this are the agreement with Mauritius for refueling and crew transfer, and repair agreements with the PDRY.

The seizure of territory mission is very difficult to determine. It probably cannot be done with the information available at this classification. The Soviet Navy has a mission of taking and holding territory in conjunction with operations with the Soviet Army or Air Forces. It is not likely to perform such operations outside this context. Therefore, it would perform this mission in the Indian Ocean only in conjunction with Soviet military moves in the Middle East, in Central or Southern Asia (as it did during the invasion of Afghanistan), or in conjunction with allied operations in the PDRY (as it did during the Dhofari

rebellicn) cr Ethicpia (against the Eritrean Guerrillas). The questicn of whether or not the Soviets might invade toward the Persian Gulf is outside the scope of this paper, though if a definite, consistent relationship could be shown of the Squadron building up preceding a Soviet military land action in the region, it would be very significant. The Soviet buildup in conjunction with the invasicn of Afghanistar was not distinct enough to prove such a comparison. Alsc, the sample is still small, despite the fact that the Squadron has been operating in the Indian Ocean for 15 years. Finally, a planner seeing a buildup couldn't be sure if it was in preparation for a land operatien support missicn cr for something else. In any case, a buildup should alert the planner to some upcoming event.

The Squadron's warfighting mission, by the very definition of naval forces, is unarguable. Even the merchant marine will play a role in a conflict, particularly an East-West war. Their problems in fighting a war were discussed under disruptions of Western SLOCs. In time of war, the Squadron's operations will likely revolve around suppcrt cf land operations and the interdiction of Western reaction forces. This is different from the reactive missicn cf interdicting Western forces. In the reactive mission, they would be reacting to events outside their control, while in the active mission, they would be anticipating Western reactions to their already conceived plans.

Their reactions to Western moves in the past seem to indicate an anti-CVBG role, with cruise missile cruisers and submarines entering the Indian Ocean to counter U.S. carrier forces that are perceived to be a present threat.

Of the reactive missions, the anti-SSBN mission is by far the most commonly cited. Except for two nagging facts, it would appear that it is not a major mission. The argument about numbers of SSBNs, distances to be travelled from home port to patrol area, and the resulting short time on station is very convincing. The advent of the Trident missile makes it even more so, because of the fewer number of platforms and the longer range of the missile, making the SSBN bastion concept more realistic. The nagging facts are the VLF station of Australia's Northwest Cape, announced in 1963, and Diego Garcia. If the U.S. didn't intend to operate SSBNs in the Indian Ocean, why was the VLF station built? There is no readily apparent reason, because VLF is used for submarine communications, and the station would not appear to be optimal for use in other directions. For SSBN operations anywhere else than the Indian Ocean, there would be more efficient and flexible places to build the station. The second fact is that Diego Garcia is capable of supporting SSBNs. It apparently hasn't been done to date, but the U.S. could rather rapidly begin operating SSBNs from the island. This would negate the argument of long cruise times to the patrol area. Such operations would, of course,

be more vulnerable to air attack than an SSBN bastion closer to the continental U.S.

The Soviets definitely reacted to the British withdrawing from the Persian Gulf region. Their beginning operations so soon after the British announcement, and the independence of Aden and the Aden Protectorate could not be a coincidence. Yet, filling a political vacuum is not really a true mission, separate from simply supporting the political goals of the Soviet Union. There must have been another reason for constituting the presence. The Soviets must have perceived some benefit, especially in view of the difficulty they had in maintaining a growing squadron in that distant corner of the world. Still, in the absence of the British withdrawal, it is likely that the Soviets would have delayed their permanent presence for a while longer, though it was inevitable eventually. As McGwire points out, the Soviet naval extension into the Indian Ocean was a logical development from their naval extension into the Mediterranean some years earlier. [Ref. 180].

There is no doubt that the Soviets are disturbed by the Chinese in the Indian Ocean. What is less easy to see is whether they are reacting to a Chinese threat or taking an active, aggressive role against the Chinese in the Indian Ocean. It is probable that there is some element of truth in both propositions. The Chinese threat emanates from two directions. The first is through Pakistan, a strong ally of

the Chinese. The Soviets have worked to limit Pakistani power through Afgharistan and India, but mainly through India, who has also fought the Chinese directly. Part of the Soviet relationship with India is naval diplomacy and sales of naval hardware, but this is a very small part of the Soviets' relationship with India.

The other Chinese threat is its submarine force, which is one of the largest in the world. It is limited in its range because it is primarily deisel, but it does lie along the Soviet Far Eastern sea lanes, and is not far from the approaches to the Indian Ocean.

The Soviets have consistently reacted in an interdiction role to U.S. incursions into the Indian Ocean. A prime example is their operations during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. The U.S. sent a CVBG to support a political mission, and the Soviets were able to counter with an anti-carrier battle group built around a cruise missile cruiser. Interestingly, they also reacted to the British carrier-centered force that had been present in the Indian Ocean for some time. They didn't react to the presence of the British forces themselves, but to the coincidence of the forces and a crisis that they perceived as being of vital interest to themselves (Indian-Pakistani-Chinese triangle). This may help to explain why later, in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1979-81 Iranian and Afghan crises, they initially reacted strongly and capably to Western naval forces, but

seemed to lose interest as the crisis eased, despite the fact that the Western forces remained on station for more extended periods of time. Surveillance operations were continued, but the anti-carrier forces were allowed to redeploy elsewhere.

The bottom line, then, is as expected. The Squadron has both active and reactive missions. The relative strengths between the mission categories appear to be fairly balanced, meaning that their overall mission is not primarily one or the other. This too is pretty much as expected. A naval force must always be prepared to react to an emergency, so the mission structure must make allowances for those contingencies, necessarily limiting the active missions which the force can take on at any given period of time. This is likely to fluctuate with the relative political-military tensions of the time.

A. ACTIVE MISSIONS

The primary active missions of the Squadron are naval diplomacy and warfighting. Naval diplomacy is its primary peacetime mission, designed to support the political line of the central Soviet heirarchy. Incidental to this powerfully important mission are the more adminstrative missions of supporting the fishing fleet in whatever way they require, supporting the space program, giving the naval heirarchy

bargaining power in Moscow, and gaining experience and an operational knowledge of local conditions.

In time of war, the Squadron's active missions are to interdict Western seaborne reinforcement and resupply efforts reacting to a Soviet invasion, and to seize territory and choke points coincident with land operations. This is where the SIOC question is rightly placed. The Soviets would likely stop the oil flow to the West as much as possible, but they generally think in terms of a short war, and the cutoff of oil is not so critical in that scenario. What is critical is the CVBG threatening his land forces. Therefore, the Squadron will only pursue the merchant traffic insofar as it does not interfere with the far more critical (at least until the second month of the war) task of anti-carrier warfare.

B. REACTIVE OBJECTS AND PATTERNS

To the degree that the Squadron is reactive, what is it reacting to, and what patterns, if any, can be discerned? Looking again at Watson's analysis of the standard squadron makeup, [Ref. 181]. it is difficult to imagine that the Soviets are reacting to a submarine threat. Yet, it is something that they are obviously thinking about in at least a future tense. The Squadron's hydrographic research ships collect the information necessary to fight a modern ASW

battle, and the IL-38 May aircraft at Aden and Ethiopia greatly improve their ASW stance in the Arabian Sea vicinity. Should the threat finally materialize, the Soviets should be able to adjust to it without too much difficulty, though their present capability in ASW in even the best of circumstances is suspect.

The Chinese threat, like the SSBN threat, is potential more than actual. The Chinese are allies of the Pakistanis, but that alliance poses a minimal present threat. Instead, it appears that, through aggressive diplomacy, both naval and otherwise, the Soviets are carrying out a campaign against the Chinese that appears to be more active than reactive. Pakistan is presently quite weak in comparison with India, and must move very carefully in its relations with China and the West.

The major reactive mission, then, is the interdiction of U.S. forces operating in some other mode than reacting directly to Soviet moves. It may be useful at this point to restate a set of statistics from chapter IV to indicate a reactive nature of the Squadron to any who might still tremble at the "frightening" Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean.

> By mid-1982, the Soviet ship count averaged about 25, and by year's end had fallen to approximately 20, with not more than two major surface combatants in the area for any sustained period. Within the first two months of 1983, the Soviets were maintaining only about 15 ships in the Indian Ocean, including a 'Kashin'-class guided missile destroyer and an 'Echo-II' submarine. Most of the remaining ships (were) of the small auxiliary variety. [Ref. 182].

Even with Soviet troops still fighting in Afghanistan, the crisis had eased, so the Squadron declined in numbers and composition from over 30 to about 15 ships, less than the normal pre-crisis squadron of 20-22 ships.

Anticipating a U.S. reaction would also require them to protect their own SLOCs. It is clear that the line between some active and some reactive missions is indistinct, depending for the most part on the frame of mind of the Soviet planner. For instance, interdiction of U.S. forces, whether active or reactive, involves the same physical action. The difference is that, in active interdiction, the Soviet planner has simply taken a U.S. response into account in his larger invasion plan, while in reactive interdiction, the U.S. force is responding to a third party or event. The reason the distinction is important is in helping the planner to determine what the proper action or reaction might be, depending on the state of tensions. If it is an active Soviet mission, then the likely U.S. action would be to destroy or outmaneuver the Squadron. If it is reactive, the U.S. might wish to withdraw, in order to reduce the state of tensions. In either case the Soviet actions are the same.

APPENDIX A

The tables and figures on the following pages are included for general reference information. Tables II through VI detail information on Soviet port visits to Indian Ocean area ports from 1962 to 1980. [Ref. 183]. Table VII gives a quick idea of the Squadron's operations from the Spring of 1968 to the Winter of 1973-74. [Ref. 184]. Figure A.1 [Ref. 185]. offers a comparison of the U.S. and Soviet naval efforts in the Indian Ocean from 1965 to 1980.

TABLE II

NUMBER OF SNIOS INDIAN OCEAN PORT VISITS, 1962-1980

COUNTRY/PORT	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
Bangladesh																			
Chittagong	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	9	10	11	0	0	0	0	0	0
Egypt																			
Bernice	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hurghada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ras Shukheir	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Safaga	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia																			
Assab	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	17	3	1
Dahlak Island	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	40	90	95
Massawa	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	4	1	2	1	1	1	0	1	0	7	0	10
India																			
Bombay	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	3	7	2	2	3	2	4	3	3	2	1	3
Cochin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	3
Madras	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	1	0
Vishakhapatnam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Iran																			
Bandar 'Abbas	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
Iraq																			
Basra	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	3	2	6	2	0	3	0	0	0
Khawr al Amaya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Umm Qasr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	7	15	11	0	7	4	4	0	0
Kenya																			
Mombasa	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	3	7	0	2	5	4	1	0	3	0	2	0
Kerguelen Islands																			
Port-aux-Français	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
Kuwait																			
Mina' al-Ahmadi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malagasy Republic																			
Tamatave	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

[a] Excludes port visits in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Bay of Bengal.

TABLE II (Cont.)

COUNTRY/PORT	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
Maldive Islands																			
Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	1	4	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Mauritius																			
Port Louis	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	12	22	11	26	12	15	10	11	7	3	14	3
Mozambique																			
Beira	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	4	4
Maputo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	2	5	0
Nacala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	2	0
Pakistan																			
Karachi	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	2	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	0
People's Dem. Rep. of Yemen																			
Aden	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	10	10	23	6	15	46	36	28	38	74	40	88
Perim Island	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Seychelles																			
Victoria	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	8	4
Somalia																			
Berbera	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	9	15	17	44	60	48	75	52	0	0	0
Chisimaio(Kismayu)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	5	9	9	0	0	0
Mogadiscio	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	8	4	6	13	5	7	5	4	3	0	0	0
Sri Lanka																			
Colombo	1	0	0	0	0	6	3	9	3	3	17	8	10	10	11	10	7	3	16
Sudan																			
Port Sudan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Tanzania																			
Dar es Salaam	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zanzibar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Terr. Afars & Issas																			
Djibouti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	7
United Arab Emirates																			
Dubai	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
Yemen Arab Republic																			
Hodeida	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	1	2	5	3	1	3	10

TABLE III

SWIOS SHIP DAYS IN INDIAN OCEAN PORT VISITS, 1962-1980

COUNTRY/PORT	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
Bangladesh																			
Chittagong	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	644	2222	1045	0	0	0	0	0	0
Egypt																			
Bernaise	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suez[a]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1574	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ras Shukheir	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Safaga	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia																			
Assab	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	216	0	3
Dahlak Island	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	815	1336	2175
Massawa	0	0	0	4	11	0	14	10	7	0	5	5	7	0	5	0	83	0	91
India																			
Bombay	0	0	0	0	12	0	28	12	42	20	14	18	14	22	21	28	9	5	15
Cochin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13
Madras	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	0	0	0	0	18	0	16	0	0	0	5	0
Vishakhapatnam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
Iran																			
Bandar 'Abbas	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	40	0	0	20	0	0	0	14	0	0	0	0
Iraq																			
Basra	0	0	0	0	0	0	27	0	0	83	89	6	325	26	41	14	0	0	0
Khawr al Amaya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Umm Qasr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	39	15	25	63	202	115	89	77	70	23	58	0
Kenya																			
Mombasa	0	0	0	0	0	0	33	19	34	0	11	28	23	4	0	9	0	9	0
Kerguelen Islands																			
Port-aux-Français	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	20	46	0	6	0	0	0
Kuwait																			
Mina' al-Ahmadi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malagasy Republic																			
Tamatave	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Maldive Islands																			
Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	72	5	28	5	0	4	0	0	0	0

[a] Includes port visits in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Bay of Bengal.

TABLE III (Cont.)

COUNTRY/PORT	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
Mauritius																			
Port Louis	0	0	0	0	0	9	11	81	129	49	154	139	84	89+	64	43	19	64	37
Mozambique																			
Beira	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	3	14	33	33
Maputo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	64	16	49	0
Nacala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	37	0	12	0
Pakistan																			
Karachi	0	0	0	0	0	0	27	16	20	0	0	0	0	12	24	0	0	10	0
People's Dem. Rep. of Yemen																			
Aden	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	90	91	136	29	88	340	521	214	263	1121	542	1194
Perim Island	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Seychelles																			
Victoria	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	20	36	27
Somalia																			
Berbera	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	27	76	87	153	886	851	1160	1413	930	0	0	0
Chisimaio (Kismayu)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	22	0	0	0	61	124	43	0	0	0
Mogadiscio	0	0	0	0	0	0	27	20	41	43	96	33	46	54	33	12	0	0	0
Sri Lanka																			
Colombo	6	0	0	0	0	24	22	37	7	11	189	46	46	44	25	44	23	15	69
Sudan																			
Port Sudan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	6	32	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
Tanzania																			
Dar es Salaam	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zanzibar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Terr. Afars & Issas																			
Djibouti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	30
United Arab Emirates																			
Dubai	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	4
Yemen Arab Republic																			
Hodeida	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	4	6	103	22	1	17	49

TABLE IV

AVERAGE PORT VISIT LENGTHS, 1962-1980

COUNTRY/PORT	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
Bangladesh																			
Chittagong	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	72	222	93	0	0	0	0	0	0
Egypt																			
Berenice	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Berghada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	48	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ras Shukheir	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Safaga	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia																			
Assab	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	13	3	3
Dahlak Island	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	30	27	23
Massawa	0	0	0	4	12	6	7	3	7	4	5	5	7	0	5	0	12	0	9
India																			
Bombay	0	0	0	0	6	0	4	4	6	10	7	0	7	0	7	6	5	5	5
Cochin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
Madras	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Vishakhapatnam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
Iran																			
Bandar'Abbas	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	5	0	0	7	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
Iraq																			
Basra	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	42	30	3	48	13	5	5	0	0	0
Khawr al Amaya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Umm Qasr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	9	13	30	11	11	10	6	6	0
Kenya																			
Mombasa	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	5	0	0	0	0	4	0	3	0	5	0
Kerguelen Islands																			
Port-aux-Francais	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	20	46	0	0	0	0	0
Kuwait																			
Mina' al-Ahmadi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malagasy Republic																			
Tamatave	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Maldive Islands																			
Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	14	5	7	5	0	4	0	0	0	0
Mauritius																			
Port Louis	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	7	6	4	6	13	6	0	6	6	6	5	7
Mozambique																			
Beira	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	14	8	6
Maputo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	6	10	0
Nacala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	6	0
Pakistan																			
Karachi	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	3	10	0	0	0	0	6	5	0	0	5	0
People's Dem. Rep. of Yemen																			
Aden	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	5	7	6	3	6	7	14	8	7	15	14	14
Perim Island	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Seychelles																			
Victoria	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	10	7	7
Somalia																			
Berbera	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	4	9	18	14	24	19	18	0	0	0
Chisimaio (Kismayu)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	11	0	0	0	12	14	5	0	0	0
Mogadiscio	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	4	10	6	7	7	6	11	6	4	0	0	0

[a] Includes port visits in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Bay of Bengal.

TABLE IV (Cont.)

COUNTRY/PORT	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
Sri Lanka																			
Colombo	6	0	0	0	0	4	6	4	2	4	6	8	3	4	2	4	3	3	4
Sudan																			
Port Sudan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	8	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Tanzania																			
Dar es Salaam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zanzibar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Terr. Afars & Issas																			
Djibouti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	4
United Arab Emirates																			
Dubai	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	4
Yemen Arab Republic																			
Hodeida	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	4	3	21	7	1	6	3

TABLE V

TOTALS OF INDIAN OCEAN PORT VISITS BY PORT, 1962-1980

Port	Total Ship Days	Comments
1. Berbera, Somalia	5,539	The Soviet presence in Somalia began in 1968. In the early 1970s, the Soviets began an almost constant presence in Berbera and used this port for fleet logistical support. Berbera remained a forward base supporting the Indian Ocean Squadron until 1977, when the Somalis evicted the Soviets because of the latter's support of Ethiopia in the Ethiopian-Somali War. The loss of these facilities was a setback for the Soviets. The alternative facilities they developed in Ethiopia were less ideally located than Berbera.
2. Aden, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)	4,617	Port visits to Aden were significant as early as 1969 and were quite heavy in the early 1970s, indicating that the port was used to support the Indian Ocean Squadron. Visits increased after the Soviet expulsion from Somalia, reflecting the logistical problems associated with the loss of Berbera.
3. Dahlak Island, Ethiopia	4,386	The intense naval activity at this island indicates that the Soviets are developing a logistical base here for support to their squadron. This base should provide the same degree of support that Berbera did, although Dhalak is not as ideally located.
4. Chittagong, Bangladesh	3,920	This activity reflects Soviet assistance in clearing Bengali ports, which had been damaged during the Indo-Pakistani War. It does not appear that the Soviet Navy was granted concessions for this assistance, since there have been no port visits to Bangladesh since 1974.
5. Hurghada, Egypt	1,574	This activity reflects Soviet minesweeping of the Gulf of Suez in 1974. No visits have been made to the port since the operation was completed, and no visits have been made to Egypt since the expulsion in 1976.
6. Port Louis, Mauritius	965	Good will/operational visits, which began in 1967 and were in support of naval operations in the southern Indian Ocean.
7. Um Qasr, Iraq	768	Good will/operational visits, probably to maintain Soviet influence and an occasional naval presence in the Persian Gulf. These visits led to speculation that the Soviets were developing a forward base in Iraq, but there is little evidence to support such speculation.
8. Basra, Iraq	609	See entry 7.
9. Colombo, Sri Lanka	548	Good will/operational visits, which began in 1962.
10. Mogadiscio, Somalia	411	Good will/operational visits from 1968 to 1977. These visits ended when the Soviets were expelled from Berbera. (See entry 1.)
11. Bombay, India	268	Good will/operational visits, which began in 1966.
12. Chisimaio (Kismayu), Somalia	250	See entry 10.
13. Massawa, Ethiopia	236	Official and good will/operational visits, which began in 1965. Many of these were for participation in Ethiopian Navy Day, a holiday of considerable regional significance. These visits became more frequent in 1978, when the Soviets, as a result of their assistance to the Marxist Ethiopian government in its war with Somalia, began using Ethiopia to support their Indian Ocean Squadron.
14. Hodeida, Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen)	232	These visits, which began in 1963, became more frequent in 1976, possibly reflecting Soviet assistance to the Yemeni Navy.

TABLE V (Cont.)

	Port	Total Ship Days	Comments
15.	Assab, Ethiopia	230	Good will/operational visits, which began in 1977.
16.	Mombasa, Kenya	170	Good will/operational visits, which began in 1968.
17.	Victoria, Seychelles	152	Official and good will/operational visits, which began in 1967.
18.	Maputo, Mozambique	139	Good will/operational visits from 1977 onward, possibly a show of support for Mozambique.
19.	Male, Maldive Islands	138	Good will/operational visits from 1969 onward.
20.	Karachi, Pakistan	109	Official and good will/operational visits, which began in 1968.
21.	Bandar'Abbas, Iran	101	Good will/operational visits from 1968 to 1976.
22.	Beira, Mozambique	89	See entry 18.
23.	Port-aux-Français, Kerguelen Islands	77	Good will/operational visits, which began in 1972.
24.	Madras, India	59	Good will/operational visits, which began in 1968.
25.	Nacala, Mozambique	49	See entry 18.
26.	Dar es Salaam, Tanzania	48	Good will/operational visits, which began in 1968.
27.	Port Sudan, Sudan	32	Good will/operational visits, which began in 1969.
28.	Djibouti, Territory of Afars and Issas	32	Good will/operational visits, which began in 1978.
29.	Vishakhapatnam, India	26	Good will/operational visits in 1970 and 1973.
30.	Tamatave, Malagasy Republic	24	Good will/operational visits, which began in 1968.
31.	Cochin, India	21	Good will/operational visits in 1976 and 1980.
32.	Mina' al-Ahmadi	21	Good will/operational visits in 1969 and 1970.
33.	Bormica, Egypt	15	Official and good will/operational visits in 1968.
34.	Zanzibar, Tanzania	10	Good will/operational visit in 1969.
35.	Khawr al Amaya, Iraq	9	Good will/operational visit in 1973.
36.	Dubai, United Arab Emirates	9	Good will/operational visits, which began in 1976.
37.	Safaga, Egypt	6	Good will/operational visit in 1969.
38.	Perim Island, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	8	Operational visit in 1979.
39.	Ras Shukheir, Egypt	2	Good will/operational visit in 1970.

TABLE VI

SNIOS CUMULATIVE SHIP-DAYS IN PORT BY COUNTRY, 1962-1980

	Country	Total Ship Days
1.	Somalia	6,199
2.	Ethiopia	4,812
3.	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)	4,625
4.	Bangladesh	3,920
5.	Egypt (Red Sea coast only)	1,999
6.	Iraq	1,386
7.	Mauritius	965
8.	Sri Lanka	548
9.	India	376
10.	Mozambique	261
11.	Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen)	232
12.	Kenya	170
13.	Seychelles	132
14.	Maldive Islands	120
15.	Pakistan	109
16.	Iran	101
17.	Kerguelen Islands	77
18.	Tanzania	58
19.	Sudan	32
20.	Territory of Afars and Issas	32
21.	Malagasy Republic	24
22.	Kuwait	21
23.	United Arab Emirates	9

TABLE VII

SNIOS OPERATIONS, 1968-1976

Period	Force Levels	Force Mix	Force Activity	Force Location
Spring 1968 to fall 1969	Deployments begin; force levels show marked seasonal variation.	Force generally composed of 1-2 SSM-armed surface combatants and 1 SAM- or gun-armed destroyer; gun-armed cruiser occasionally present; *Foxtrot*-class attack submarines deploy in winter months from Oct 1968; presence of POL ships intermittent.	Activity levels low; very little or no shore support; deployments average four months in duration.	Forces widely dispersed.
Fall 1969 to summer 1970	Force levels rise; seasonal variations continue; force also intermittently augmented by units transiting from Soviet Western fleets via Cape of Good Hope to Pacific Fleet.	Amphibious ship deployments begin Sep 1969; SSM-armed submarines begin periodic deployments same month.	Basic pattern continues.	Activity becomes concentrated in northwest quadrant of Indian Ocean; primarily off Socotra Island and Cape Guardafui.
Summer 1970 to fall 1972	Basic pattern continues.	Near-continuous SSM-armed surface combatant deployments end Jul 1970; continuous T-58 minesweeper deployments begin Oct 1970; reconnaissance overflights by USSR-based aircraft begin 1970; POL ship presence becomes continuous.	Basic pattern continues; SSM-armed submarine deployments now keyed to U.S. aircraft carrier deployments to area.	Basic pattern continues, with heavy use of anchorages near Seychelles and Diego Garcia during Indo-Pakistani War.
Fall 1972 to winter 1973/1974	Seasonal variations end; force levels stable except during U.S. aircraft carrier deployments, when force is augmented by cruise-missile submarines.	*Pyn*-class barracks and repair ship arrives Berbera Oct 1972; continuous *Foxtrot*-class submarine deployments begin spring 1973; continuous *Petya*-class escort ship deployments begin Mar 1973.	Major expansion of Berbera facilities begins late 1972; significantly greater shore support provided; average length of deployments more than doubles to 8-9 months each, while base activity level remains low.	Basic pattern continues as in 1969-1970.
Winter 1973/1974 to end 1976	Basic pattern continues; force now usually include 1-3 units from Soviet Western fleets which, having transited the Suez Canal, operate in Indian Ocean for 4-5 months before ultimately transferring to Pacific Fleet.	Near-continuous *Amur*-class repair ship deployments begin Feb 1974; 8,500 ton floating drydock arrives Berbera Dec 1975; Il-38 ASW aircraft begin deploying to Somalia Apr 1975; Tu-95Ds follow in Oct 1976; periodic intelligence collector deployments being May 1976[b] *Pyn*-class barracks ship returns to Vladivostok Oct/Nov 1976.	*Amur*-class repair ship in Berbera almost continuously since Feb 1974; aerial reconnaissance and ASW activity increases; logistic support occasionally provided by Black Sea fleet units passing through Suez Canal from Jun 1975.	Minor combatant or intelligence collector assumes patrol in Straits of Hormuz May 1974; intermittent surface combatant presence established 1975 off southeast African littoral.

[a]Does not include activities of units deployed to Bangladesh and the Gulf of Suez for minesweeping and salvage operations. See Chapter III.

[b]An AGI had briefly deployed during the Indo-Pakistani War.



Year	USSR	USA
1965	-	1,100
1969	4,200	1,100
1972	8,800	1,100
1974	10,500	2,600
1976	7,300	1,400
1977	7,050	1,761
1978	8,450	1,703
1979	7,550	3,207

Figure A.1 SOVIET NAVY SHIP-DAYS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, 1965-1979.

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
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